Military Intelligence

PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN

MI TRAINING

ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION

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Writer of the Quarter

The *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* is pleased to announce the **Writer of the Quarter** (October-December 1995) is Major Darrell W. Bott for his article, "Maintaining Language Proficiency." Congratulations to Major Bott and thanks to all of our authors for their great articles, book reviews, and letters to the editor. It is contributions like yours that make this bulletin the professional forum for the Military Intelligence Corps.

Subscription Rates Increase

Effective 1 October 1995, the Government Printing Office increased the *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* subscription rates to $9.00 (Domestic, APO, and FPO) and $11.25 (Foreign). A subscription form reflecting the new rates can be found on page 44.

Articles Wanted!

Upcoming issues of the *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* will cover a wide variety of issues affecting the Intelligence Corps today and in the future. As always, the Bulletin relies upon its readership to supply articles that stimulate discussion and inform other members of the intelligence profession. We welcome articles from personnel from all levels of Army intelligence, our sister Services, joint activities, agencies, and allies. We are particularly interested in articles on the following topics:

- [ ] "How to" articles (e.g., establish a collection and jamming site, maintain tactical intelligence and electronic warfare equipment).
- [ ] Tactics, forces, and technology of potential adversaries (e.g., Bosnian forces and factions, Gulf States or Middle East projections).
- [ ] Coordinating U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force signals intelligence and electronic warfare operations.
- [ ] U.S. Navy shipborne intercept and direction-finding support to forces ashore.
- [ ] Marine Expeditionary Force intelligence support to Army operations.
- [ ] National agency support to Intel XXI, command and control warfare, joint intelligence communications, or information operations.

How to Submit an Article

1. Select a relevant topic of interest to the military intelligence community.
2. Write an outline to organize your work. Put the bottom line up front and write clear, concise introduction and conclusion paragraphs.
3. Follow proper rules of grammar. Consult **DA Pamphlet 600-67** or William A. McIntosh's **Guide to Effective Writing**, if necessary.
4. Maintain the active voice as much as possible. Write "Congress cut the budget" rather than "the budget was cut by Congress." (See **DA Pamphlet 600-67, Effective Writing for Army Leaders**, paragraph 3-2,b[1].)
5. Send the article to Commander, USAIC&FH, ATTN: ATZS-TDL-B, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000. Please include with your article—
   a. Pictures, graphics, and crests with an adequate description and photographer credits. (We can return photos if so requested.)
   b. A computer diskette, with the article in Word Perfect 5.1/5.2, ASCII, or Microsoft Word.
   c. A short biography with the full names of all authors of the article. The biography should include each author's current duty position, other related assignments, and civilian education. (Tell us if we can print your telephone number and E-mail address with the biography.)
   d. A cover letter with work, home, and E-mail addresses and telephone numbers, stating your intent to publish the article.
   e. A release by your local security office to ensure your article is unclassified, nonsensitive, and releasable to the public.
6. Remember, content is the most important part of your article. When in doubt, **send us your article**—we can work out the details.

Military Intelligence

PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN

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FEATURES

VANTAGE POINT

by Brigadier General Charles W. Thomas

Every military intelligence (MI) officer should make a commitment to a program of self-development. Why? Simply put, our military education system does not have the resources, or the time, when you consider the diverse things you must do in a career, to provide continuing education opportunities for officers. Further, officers can not rely on formal military education alone to do the job. Most Service schools focus on doctrine and the changes to doctrine as they develop in the Army. It is difficult for Service schools to work on the application of that doctrine beyond practical exercises in classroom environments. Furthermore, officers can only get out of courses what they are willing to put into them. It is often easy to do the bare minimum, to consider a school an opportunity to relax and recharge your batteries for the next demanding assignment. While that may be a good idea in many ways, what you may lose is a learning experience that will not present itself again.

Formal Education

In MI professional development, the last formal education most officers receive is the Officer Advanced Course (OAC). The OAC has as its focus the preparation of the officer to serve as a battalion S2, an assistant brigade S2, a corps or division staff officer, or an MI company commander. Most OAC students are in their fourth year of service with many of them just transitioning into the MI Corps from other branches.

Unless an officer is applying for, offered, or assigned to a position requiring specialized training (e.g., Post Graduate Intelligence Program, Junior Officer Career Cryptologic Program, special human intelligence programs, or assignment-specific training for counterintelligence and signals intelligence), the OAC is the last educational opportunity they receive to prepare for future assignments of increasing responsibility. So it is important for officers to take responsibility for their education as military professionals. When you measure success among MI officers, it is the officers who have assumed this kind of responsibility that lead the way.

Professional Reading

What does good professional self-development include? First, a solid military reading program. What you read does not have to be strictly on combat related topics. Find materials about operations past, present, and future that span the spectrum of military involvement. Read about operations other than war

(peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, peace enforcement, etc.). Study the cultures of both potential enemies and allies. Develop an understanding of the other Services, how their intelligence systems work, and how we work together. Most of all, study our battlefield operating system (BOS) because it will require a continuous learning process to keep up with it. Learn how the Intelligence BOS fits into and supports the Army at large as well as the joint world. In fact, most, if not all, of your joint education will be on your own.

Intelligence Architecture

The second, and most critical, aspect of your self-development needs is to learn our intelligence architecture. You cannot count on getting it all in OAC or elsewhere, because it is constantly evolving. You must learn on the job and on your own. Your knowledge needs to grow as the architecture changes. Every intelligence officer who wants to be effective needs to know how to get intelligence, where to get it (who has what), and how to pass it. From manipulation of databases (national through tactical) to liaison with other intelligence activities (joint, allied, Service, and interagency), the intelligence officer needs to know the systems in the architecture, their capabilities, and their limitations. Furthermore, the officer must know how the systems connect to each other and the warfighter.

Responsibility

So, what can you do? From my perspective the best officers take responsibility for continuing their education. You need to make the most out of every school opportunity afforded to you and every job you hold. You must do what it takes to make yourself as knowledgeable as possible about our business and, along the way, help those of us responsible for training. We want your feedback about how we do our job. When we send you surveys seeking information on how to improve our education system, support us. Think about your experiences and give us your honest opinion on how we can do things better or what is working well. Furthermore, become an educator to those coming up behind you. Guide and mentor junior officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers. Our success as a branch is a collective effort. You may find that to teach others, one must have taught oneself.

ALWAYS OUT FRONT!

by Command Sergeant Major Randolph S. Hollingsworth

If our army is to be successful in the 21st century, we must prepare our soldiers today. I depend on my noncommissioned officers to lead, train, and mentally prepare our soldiers for the future.

— Colonel Halbert F. Stevens, Commander, 106th MI Battalion

As we move into the next century and the age of user-friendly technology, I often think of the young men and women who are working so hard to get us there. The Information Age, soon to be America's greatest era and the Army's finest hour, is not something that will just happen. It will be the result of the dedication, patriotism, and most importantly, the commitment to freedom shown by soldiers and the Department of Defense civilians who support them.

The commitment to excellence in the military intelligence (MI) community is the value I most appreciate as I travel around today's Army. Our nation is an example to all nations, and our freedom is its greatest testament. Defending that freedom magnifies the importance of being a soldier. No job is more important than being a soldier—a person who serves our country in peace and war. There is no profession more honorable, more respected, or more trusted, than that of a soldier. Every person in uniform should be proud and committed to defending our nation.

This commitment stands above all else. Without commitment, our freedom, our rights, and the peace we take for granted would cease to exist. Commitment is the voluntary acceptance of duty. It is an affirmative response to a call to arms to defend our nation. It is the dedication to do more—to spread our freedoms outside our own borders, to defend the lives, families, and property of millions of who are not American. Soldiers provide food for the hungry, clothes for the naked, and shelter for the homeless. They help those whose lives are touched by tragedy. Success is less of a measure of the soldier's worth than the commitment he shows.

Soldiers brought reality to the dream we celebrate each Independence Day. Soldiers who fought and died on foreign and American soil brought us freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and the countless other freedoms that are uniquely American. Soldiers are the reason our Constitution is as strong today as it was the day our founders signed it.

The preamble of our constitution begins, *"We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessing of liberty...."* It is through the enduring commitment of our soldiers that this preamble is realized. Soldiers provided security for the American pioneers of our past, and soldiers will protect the unexplored roads leading into the 21st century.

The United States will remain the land of the free and the home of the brave because we have brave men and women who believe in our nation and know the importance of our Army. Once we become members of the Army, we join others in sharing a strong commitment to the ideals of our nation. Never question why you decided to be a soldier. Being a soldier is the toughest and most honorable job in America. You are part of the history of military dedication which has made our nation great. You stand above all the world's soldiers.

Undoubtedly, the past has influenced our patriotism. History instills duty and commitment in the hearts and minds of all soldiers. The soldiers who participated in U.S. operations in Panama and Southwest Asia are tied to the soldiers of our past. All soldiers form a long line defined by dedication to success. Brave soldiers with different backgrounds and skills combined to assure a successful outcome of these conflicts due to the Army tradition of excellence. Never doubt the importance of your job. You should never be afraid or ashamed to wear your uniform or to salute the flag in public anywhere in the world. Be brave—stand up and say, "I am a soldier, a freedom fighter, America depends on me to keep other Americans free."

The Army does not exist to promote war, but to promote peace. Our peace is kept through our strength. America is strong because of our Army. Our Army is strong because of its soldiers, particularly those in the MI Corps. As we go into the future, remember that past soldiers have given us the present. Today's soldiers make their leaders and their nation proud.

Your patriotism and commitment are the key factors when our nation goes to war. Be faithful to the Army, totally committed to your nation, and proud to be a soldier. Always remember the importance of your profession.

ALWAYS OUT FRONT!

FROM THE EDITOR

Challenges and Opportunities

The Military Intelligence Corps is a place of challenges and opportunities. This issue of the *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* discusses the three pillars of professional development in the Warfighter XXI vision: self-development, unit training, and institutional training. In his Vantage Point column, Brigadier General Charles W. Thomas talks about professional self-development. While Brigadier General Thomas specifically discusses commissioned officer self-development, what he says has equal applicability to all soldiers and civilians within the Military Intelligence Corps. Our feature articles address the training challenges brought on by diverse missions, new systems integration, revised doctrine, and personnel reduction. The authors bring out many of the issues facing military intelligence training in today's force. They also show how creative approaches to training, use of technology, and critical examination of requirements lead to better training.

The same turmoil that generates the challenges to military intelligence also provides opportunities. The Army is in the process of developing organizations, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for the Force Projection Army and the Force XXI. Now is the time for intelligence officers, noncommissioned officers, and civilians to step forward, state their views, and make a difference in how the Army will operate. The *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* is one forum for voicing your opinion and making a difference.

Future Issues

We develop the focus and content of each issue based on your input. In upcoming issues of the bulletin, we plan to address division intelligence and electronic warfare operations, information operations, Intel XXI, and intelligence support to targeting. Some of the questions we hope to discuss are:

How do you employ the general and direct support military intelligence companies?

Does planning and directing information operations require a unique organization?

Is battle damage assessment a tactical-level task?

Does the division analysis and control element need more personnel?

Farewell Captain Leeder

Change is inevitable in the Army. Captain Stephen Leeder has moved from Editor of the *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* to Doctrine Writing Team Chief within the Doctrine and Publications Division. The right soldier in the right job, he has taken on the task of getting sound intelligence doctrine to the field. Good luck Captain Leeder!

Some Final Thoughts

We observed the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II in 1995. This year also marked the 30th anniversary of the insertion of U.S. combat ground forces into the conflict in Republic of Vietnam. Take a moment and look around at the senior officers and noncommissioned officers in your unit. How many are veterans of the Vietnam War? Understanding this generation of soldiers is an important part of ensuring their efforts in training, doctrine, and force modernization continue into the 21st century. These soldiers endured the "hollow" force of the '70s and rebuilt the Army in the '80s. While others left the Army, they stayed in and fixed the training and leadership problems that followed the Vietnam War. Their commitment to training and standards manifested itself in the Army's success during Operation DESERT STORM in the '90s.

Like World War II, the Vietnam War will slip into the pages of history. The hard lessons of that war and the early '70s will fade. Take the opportunity to talk to the men and women who served in that era before they leave the service. Read about their experiences in books like the **Prodigal Soldiers, We Were Soldiers Once...and Young, Vietnam,** and **The Best and The Brightest.** Let their lessons help us to cheat history and not repeat the mistakes that led to the "hollow" force.

Michael C. Taylor

LETTERS

To the Editor:

In the April-June 1995 issue of the *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*, you published an article by two Officer Advanced Course instructors on the subject of "Center of Gravity." In this article, the authors encouraged battalion and brigade S2s to seek out the enemy's center of gravity in their threat analysis and evaluation. They argued that this process of determining the enemy center of gravity was the key to conducting successful intelligence analysis and targeting at the tactical level. I believe that they were wrongfully applying this doctrinal concept. They have misused the terminology, and in espousing this as military intelligence doctrine, have put the credibility of our S2s at risk. Please, set the record straight and get us back on the path of doctrinal accuracy.

In our branch, information is our primary weapon and words are our primary tools. We must be careful the application of doctrinal terms. The authors selectively pulled a quotation from **FM 100-5, Operations**, to support their thesis. Context, critical to understanding the meaning and use of the term "center of gravity," comes from the preceding and subsequent paragraphs. The preceding paragraph on page 6-7 states, "*Several key concepts of campaign planning design guide theater- and operational-level planners in their efforts.*" This passage clearly places the use of the center of gravity in the operational realm. Although this term is also used at the corps-level, in transitioning from the operational to tactical-level of operations, the term may not be meaningful at the tacti-

cal-level. The following extract from page 6-7 of **FM 100-5** further clarifies the use and meaning of center of gravity stating—

"*The essence of operational art lies in being able to mass effects against the enemy's main source of power—his center of gravity, which he seeks to protect. At any given time, however, a center of gravity may not be immediately discernible. For example, the center of gravity might concern the mass of the enemy's units, but that mass might not have been formed. Additionally, the center of gravity may be abstract, such as the enemy's national will or an alliance structure, or concrete, such as strategic reserves, C^2, or industrial bases and LOCs.*"

Our doctrine for intelligence operations at the tactical level is clear and concise. Battalion and brigade S2s conduct intelligence preparation of the battlefield to support tactical engagements. At this level of threat analysis, the S2s are dealing with enemy capabilities. The focus should be on the enemy's doctrine, tactics, and procedures. The end results of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process where rubber meets the road are products that support the commander's fire and maneuver. The threat model produced by the battalion and brigade S2s must be useful to the commander, supporting his application of combat power on the battlefield. **FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield**, clearly establishes the need for an evaluation of the threat strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities, including an evaluation of typical high value targets. Center of gravity just does not meet the needs of the tactical

commander. At the battalion and brigade level of operations, the enemy's source of power are generally his combat forces. When tank meets tank or infantryman meets infantryman on the battlefield, center of gravity becomes esoteric.

I am not saying that we must always stay within the confines of the doctrinal definition. There may be situations, especially in the operations other than war arena, where new or unusual methods of analysis are not only acceptable but necessary. We must, however, be extremely careful in what we say and write. When applying doctrinal terms in a new or unusual manner, we must explain this carefully. Always place the "nondoctrinal" use of terminology in context and carefully consider what it is you are trying to portray. Remember, information is our main contribution to the combat commanders. Words are our projectiles and cannot be launched without careful consideration and accuracy.

Major George J. Franz
Student
School of Advanced Military Studies
Lansing, Kansas

To the Editor:

Probably the most valuable piece of information that I have come across recently, for our community, I have found in the *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*, April-June 1995 issue: notably the "JTF JIC Operations: Critical Success Factors," "Joint Intelligence Courses at NMITC"— the entire issue. A job well done!

M.E. Idrogo
Naval Reserve JIC Pacific Unit 1070
Naval Air Station, Dallas, Texas

APPLYING
STANDARDS
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STANDARDS

by Captain Andrew L.
Hergenrother

To be successful in combat, the Army must train continually to develop and maintain combat ready soldiers, leaders, and units that can perform assigned tasks to specific standards.
—FM 25-101
Battle Focused Training

Applying standards to training is essential to all battlefield operating systems (BOSs). The Intelligence BOS is no exception. **FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations,** clearly states, *"Standards provide commanders a means of measuring intelligence readiness and equipping subordinates with clearly defined training objectives."*

We are all familiar with task, conditions, and standards. How often have we heard, "Train to standard not to time?" General Carl E. Vuono stated in **FM 22-100, Military Leadership,** *"A leader must know, and always enforce, established Army standards."* Yet, do we really know what are standards, where to find them, and how to apply them?

What is a Standard?

Staff Sergeant Judd Sweitzer wrote an article for *The NCO Journal,* Summer 1994, titled "The Standard is the Standard is the Standard." In it he states, *"We must train our soldiers to standard. We must challenge our soldiers, push them to meet our most strenuous demands, and hold them responsible for their actions. If we can do this during*

peacetime, they will be ready for the rigors of combat." For me, there is no clearer reason for establishing and enforcing standards than the fact it saves lives.

Finding Standards

For those in the military, standards are associated with a clearly defined set of conditions applied to a specific task. The Army provides standards for military training in field manuals, training circulars (TCs), mission training plans, drill books, soldier manuals, and Army regulations (ARs). Where training standards are undefined, leaders and trainers establish them based on existing doctrine, ARs, and the guidance of superiors. In so doing, leaders must ensure the standards are challenging, attainable, and easily evaluated.

The development of standards applicable to intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) is uniquely challenging. Military intelligence (MI) professionals operate at all levels. MI soldiers train

to be everything from geopolitical analysts at national-level agencies to ground surveillance radar operators supporting infantry battalions. With all the diversity associated with IEW operations, the application of standards remains key to successful training and mission accomplishment.

The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca published three key manuals that provide standards for training and evaluating tactical IEW operations. They are—

☐ **TC 34-10-20, MI Combat Assessment Tables.** This circular addresses critical tasks, conditions, and standards for tactical IEW operations from crew through battalion. Although outraced by modern technology, **TC 34-10-20** remains a valuable tool that trainers can use to evaluate preparation, movement and site preparation; collection and jamming operations; reporting; mission management; and movement and redeployment.

- ☐ **TC 34-10-20-1, MI Collective Training Standards Document, Volume I.** Volume I provides MI commanders with information that will help them develop a tactical training evaluation program. It specifies tasks, conditions, and standards for G2 staff, MI battalion staff, interrogation platoon, and counterintelligence platoon operations.

- ☐ **TC 34-10-20-2, MI Collective Training Document, Volume II.** TC 34-10-20-2 lists tasks, conditions, and standards applicable to tactical training and evaluation. Specifically, it covers the tasks for the ground surveillance radar platoon, QUICKFIX platoon, collection and jamming platoon. The circular also provides company and platoon common collective tasks. Again, this manual provides another detailed collection of tasks, conditions, and standards that is somewhat dated but still useful.

Changing Standards

Changes in technology, doctrine, and potential adversaries have forced commanders to refocus their mission essential task list (METL). No longer is the training emphasis on fighting mobile armored and mechanized warfare against a known, well defined enemy. Today's Army must have the ability to respond quickly and decisively to global requirements. Thus, commanders must reevaluate and update old standards. This dynamic process of fine-tuning standards is a leader's responsibility and applies to all BOSs.

General William W. Hartzog, Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), in a May 1995 message[1] to the field, highlighted the dynamic environment that exists in the Army today. In this message, he established support requirements for the Experimental Force (EXFOR) in the Advanced Warfighting Exercise (AWE) for Task Force XXI. General Hertzog specifically tasked his TRADOC organizations to deliver new doctrine, training, combat development, and experimental design initiatives to the EXFOR, the 2d Armored Division at Fort Hood, Texas, by 1 June 1996. He expects doctrinal updates in tactics, techniques, and procedures from platoon through division. Training deliverables focus on digitization of the battlefield. The combat developers must look at organizational design from team through brigade. This includes an evaluation of the communications and digital operational architecture. Finally, General Hartzog expects a complete experimental design to be tested and ready by 1 June 1996—no small task. However, this deadline is indicative of the fast-paced environment in which we live.

> ## Battle focused training must be understood by all commanders.

It is no wonder that MI professionals must be more than analysts, operators, and maintainers. In addition to being the subject matter experts on tactical-through national-level IEW systems, they must understand communications and automated processing technology. The MI soldier must also be on the cutting edge of developing and executing information operations. This diversity of skills, knowledge, and focus makes it difficult for MI leaders to establish IEW training standards.

Applying Standards

We now know what a standard is, and where to find tactical IEW standards. What remains is how to apply them. The lessons contained in **FM 25-101** are indispensable if commanders are to apply standards effectively.

FM 25-101 states, *"Commanders must establish a safe, realistic training program that is based on*

and enforces the Army's standards of performance." Further, commanders must *"observe and assess the execution of subordinate training at all levels to ensure training is conducted to standard. Leaders must demand training standards be achieved.... It is better to train to standard on a few tasks than fail to achieve the standard on many. Soldiers will remember the enforced standard."*

Battle focused training must be understood by all commanders. The unit METL is derived from war plans and external directives. Once approved, the next higher level of command consolidates the METL of subordinates. The higher command screens the METL to determine which tasks are critical to the success of its METL. These now become the battle tasks of battalion and higher units. This analysis allows commanders to focus on a few key tasks. Once narrowed down to a few tasks, the application of conditions and standards becomes less difficult.

The commander is the primary trainer. He is responsible for ensuring that training is to standard. A commander can only do this if actively involved in all aspects of planning, execution, and assessment of training. Anything less than the strictest adherence to established standards reduces mission effectiveness and could ultimately costs lives in some future force projection operation.

Endnote

1. Memorandum, HQ TRADOC, 22 May 1995, subject: Deliverables to the EXFOR by 1 June 1996.

Captain Hergenrother is currently the commander of Company D, 309th MI Battalion, at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. His previous assignments include company executive officer, mechanized infantry battalion S2, armor brigade S2, light infantry brigade S2, MI battalion assistant S-3, and division G2 operations officer. He served as a G2 operations officer during Operation JUST CAUSE. His degrees include a Bachelor of Science from the University of Albuquerque and a Master of Science in Strategic Intelligence from the Defense Intelligence College.

Training the Intelligence BOS:
An NCO's Perspective

Changes in doctrine, troop levels, and technology are pushing older systems like the AN/PPS-5 Ground Surveillance Radar out of the Army force structure.

by First Sergeant Victor Cruz-Rivera

I was very excited when I began to write this article about training the Intelligence Battlefield Operating System (BOS). After all, I have spent the last four years as a Military Intelligence (MI) Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) Academy senior instructor, chief instructor, and first sergeant at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. I have seen the changes in doctrine and personally taken part in imbedding that doctrine into the Basic (BNCOC) and Advanced (ANCOC) NCO courses.

As I sat in front of the computer, ready to pour my years of training experience onto the screen, I suddenly realized that this was going to be tougher than I had originally expected. I did not want to just regurgitate information from **FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations.** I wanted to put a new spin on training based on information brought out in numerous BNCOC and ANCOC small group discussions. I decided to tackle the issue by discussing the challenges NCOs face as MI professionals. Once defined, these challenges will underscore why it is so critical that we apply standards to intelligence training.

"On the day of battle, soldiers and units will fight as well or as poorly as they are trained." This often quoted statement from **FM 100-5, Operations,** is one of the main reasons we must apply standards to intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) training. A constant of life in MI has always been the diversity of assignments, missions, and equipment that the MI soldier encounters. Our combat arms and combat service support units usually do not have to deal with this problem. The infantry squad leader's responsibilities usually remain the same from unit to unit and assignment to assignment. Combat arms units are typically resourced better than other units and have a greater availability of equipment

because they must deploy at the first sign of hostilities. The combat arms soldier moving from a mechanized infantry unit in Europe to a mechanized infantry unit in the United States will see the same type of equipment and, with few exceptions, will perform the same tasks and duties. Once he learns basic infantry warfighting doctrine in initial entry training, he can be very certain that a large portion of that doctrine will not change. In fact, patrolling techniques and common leader combat skills have changed little over the last ten years.

Intelligence Training Challenges

The MI soldier cannot be so certain of stability. Besides his military occupational speciality (MOS) and common soldier tasks, he must contend with rapid changes in doctrine and equipment. The ongoing drawdown and continuous changes in technology predicated many of these changes. MI commanders and trainers must deal with the following challenges when planning training—

☐ **Technological Revolution.** The revolution caused by the Information Age has affected many areas in our society. Military training is one of those areas. Systems today are smaller, more powerful, and more deployable than technology fielded a mere five years ago. Advances in new technology and information processing are quickly applied to military equipment. The military trainer must stay abreast of technological changes to be able to train his subordinates.

☐ **Introduction of New Systems.** The Army constantly introduces new systems into the its inventory. MI is at the forefront of these developments because of our need to rapidly and accurately collect, process, manage, and disseminate huge amounts of information. Systems are coming on line

Although training has been in place for some time, doctrine is just reaching the field for the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System Ground Station Module.

quicker than ever. Often, newer versions or upgrades to new systems are available before the base system is fielded throughout the Army.

☐ **Lack of Doctrine.** The huge amount and availability of technology often creates a confusing system of equipment acquisition. We buy systems before we have fully developed and refined the doctrine on how to use the new systems. Confusion on who is responsible for operating and maintaining new systems also comes into play.

☐ **Difference in Units and Missions.** Lastly, differences in units and missions impact directly on the availability of systems. Systems or software purchased with the regular force in mind usually require modification to accommodate the special requirements of airborne, air assault, light, and special operations units. Modifications result in simultaneous fielding of different versions of the same system. Though the need is legitimate, it adds another dynamic for the MI trainer. Soldiers may serve in a variety of units or in support of different missions and consequently must work with two or more versions of the same system.

Conclusion

The challenges I mentioned above underscore the need and importance of achieving a common ground in IEW operations and training. The only way to achieve this is to return to doctrine and apply common standards. By applying standards to IEW training, commanders can measure their units' intelligence readiness against one common yardstick. Additionally, commanders can give their subordinates clearly defined training objectives. Trainers can use field manuals and training circulars (TCs) such as **FM 34-10, Division IEW Operations**, and TC 34-10-20, **MI Combat Assessment Tables**, to develop mission essential task lists, conduct training, and assess performance.

The value to MI soldiers is greater understanding of common MI doctrine and a grasp of the source of mission planning. The value to commanders is increased consistency of operations and ensured effectiveness of the Intelligence BOS.

First Sergeant Victor Cruz-Rivera is the first sergeant of the BNCOC, MI NCO Academy, at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Assigned to the Academy since August 1990, First Sergeant Cruz-Rivera has also served as a BNCOC senior instructor and ANCOC Chief Instructor. You can reach him at DSN 821-4219 or commercial (520) 533-4219.

S2 Training at Home

by Major Richard A. Jodoin, Jr.

A common question asked by many brigade and battalion S2s is—"How can I prepare for a Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation when training dollars are cut?" The answer is—"There is a lot you can do!" However, since time is just as precious as money, the S2 training must be a structured program that possesses the full support of the commander and division G2.

Building Blocks

So how should an S2 training plan be structured? A building block method, starting with U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) officer training, is best. As illustrated in Figure 1, the commander and the division G2 play essential roles in the S2 training plan. Their support roles in S2 training can be anything from being a principal instructor to allocating training resources. The end result of the building block method is enhanced intelligence support to the tactical warfighter.

The training must, regardless of how a unit structures its home station training, emphasize the following areas:

☐ Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process.

☐ Reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) planning and execution.

☐ Integration into the battle staff.

☐ Analysis and interpretation of the enemy.

Take each of the four areas and see how the building block method can better train S2s at your home station. Again, this proposed training plan is just that,

and any unit's training plan must fit that unit's training posture.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

The best place to start developing an S2 training program after the military intelligence (MI) officer basic and advanced courses (OBC, OAC) should be at the division G2 level. The G2 is both the division commander's senior intelligence officer and trainer. As the senior intelligence trainer, he should conduct IPB classes for subordinate brigade and battalion S2s. By personally teaching S2s

Figure 1. Building Blocks.

how to use IPB and its effectiveness, the G2 ensures that subordinate S2s follow the IPB process. These classes should expand upon schoolhouse instruction and gear the S2 to the division's area of operations. The G2 could incorporate this training into the monthly G2 and S2 conferences that most division G2s conduct.

The next step is for the S2 to conduct internal S2 staff training. This will allow the S2 to organize his section and drill his personnel on the IPB process before they are integrated into the rest of the battle staff. The commander can support the S2's internal training by providing the training time and guidance on how IPB should support his decisionmaking process.

Reconnaissance and Surveillance

The same process for training S2s in the IPB process holds true for R&S planning and execution. Since the G2 is responsible for the division's R&S plan, he should take the lead in training subordinate S2s on the R&S process. The G2's classes should include discussions on what R&S assets are available, their capabilities, and best method of employment. During these sessions, the G2 must also emphasize when the R&S plans are due at the different levels.

Following the G2's training, the next step is for the S2 to conduct internal training. The S2 must train his battlefield intelligence coordination center (BICC) officer in R&S planning. As his point of contact for R&S, the S2 must prepare the BICC to—

☐ Develop R&S plans.

- ☐ Brief the commander and supporting R&S assets.
- ☐ Ensure the R&S plan gets to the next higher echelon.

Since R&S is a key to battlefield intelligence, R&S training should also include the unit S3 and supporting reconnaissance assets. This allows the unit to train as it fights. The commander's role in R&S training is to provide training resources and guidance on his vision of R&S planning and execution.

This training experience can assist in the development and execution of realistic R&S lane training. Lane training allows the unit to exercise the entire R&S process at the home station. The unit can focus the lane training on what the scouts can do such as route and obstacle reconnaissance. The supporting slice elements can practice crew-level skills. The end result exercises the R&S system and gets the different elements working together at the home station.

Figure 2 provides an example of the effects of poor R&S training and execution. The lack of an integrated division R&S plan in the Figure 2 scenario would result in no division early warning in the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry Regiment sector, the area of the enemy's main effort. There is no doubt the battalion's S2 developed an effective R&S plan. However, as part of the division's overall plan, the battalion and brigade S2s must send it to the higher echelon. In this case, the division G2 had no known coverage in the south at his level.

Battle Staff Integration

If the S2 conducts the IPB and R&S training as discussed, he is prepared to assist the commander in planning, wargaming and decisionmaking. The commander and S3 may tend to disregard the S2 because of his relative lack of experience compare to others in the battle staff. An effective battle staff must have the S2 as a vital player, just like

Figure 2. Effects of Poor R&S Training and Execution.

the S3 and the fire support officer. The S2 must be the commander's expert on the enemy. The other staff members feed into these three key battle staff members (S2, S3, and fire support officer). If the battle staff follows the steps of the decisionmaking process as they are outlined in the Command and General Staff College's **Student Text 101-5, Command Staff Decision Processes**, January 1994, then all staff elements will be successful.

Analysis and Interpretation

My final comments concern the S2's analysis and interpretation of the enemy. If the S2 expects to fully integrate into the battle staff, he and his staff must know the enemy's tactics, equipment, capabilities, and limitations. Just as the G2 must train subordinate S2s, each S2 is responsible for conducting classes that teach subordinates how to analyze and interpret information. These classes could take place during section training or during sergeants' time. Unlike some other types of training, the S2 relies upon the G2's support and his initiative for this intelligence training area. The commanders and S3 cannot help you study the enemy. That is your responsibility.

If you are going to a CTC, the U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has made your intelligence train-up task

easier. The interim TRADOC 350-series pamphlets, the projected manuals depicted in Figure 3, and publications such as the National Training Center's **Red Thrust Star** discuss the opposing force (OPFOR) at the CTCs.

Figure 3. Projected Manuals.

Your preparation for a CTC rotation must start at your home station. You should use a building block method of training to develop intelligence skills that will support the commander and your unit. If mastered, these are skills that will carry you through a CTC rotation and, more importantly, lead you to success in battle.

Major Jodoin is attending the Command and General Staff College. His most recently served as the S2, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment at Fort Irwin, California. Major Jodoin received a bachelors degree from Norwich University and a masters degree from California Coast University.

Maintaining Language Proficiency

by Major Darrell W. Bott

Maintain Proficiency. Establish consistent approaches to collective and individual training. Collective training should be conducted at a baseline proficiency level consistent with unit readiness standards. Individual training, particularly language training, should be creative and challenge soldiers to go beyond Army standards.
—FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations

Jenny just joined a National Guard military intelligence (MI) linguist unit. She is excited to get orders to enter basic combat training and attend the Basic Arabic Course at the Defense Language Institute (DLI) in California. After over a year of study at DLI, Jenny attains level 2 in listening, reading, and speaking on her Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) in Arabic. (Figure 1 illus-

LEVEL	FUNCTION	CONTEXT*	ACCURACY
	Tasks accomplished, attitudes expressed, tone conveyed.	Topics, subject areas, activities, and jobs addressed.	Acceptability, quality, and accuracy of message conveyed.
5	Functions in a manner that is equivalent to that of an ENS.	All subjects.	Performance equivalent to an ENS.
4	Able to tailor language to fit audience, counsel, persuade, negotiate, represent a point of view, and interpret informally for dignitaries.	All topics normally pertinent to professional needs in almost all professional situations, including conferences, lectures, and debates.	Nearly equivalent to an ENS. Speech is extensive, precise, appropriate to every occasion with only occasional errors.
3	Can converse in formal and informal situations, resolve problem situations, deal with unfamiliar topics, provide explanations, describe in detail, offer supported opinions, and hypothesize.	Practical, social, professional, and abstract topics, particular interests, and special fields of competence in formal and informal situations.	Errors virtually never interfere with understanding and rarely disturb the NS. Only sporadic errors in basic structures.
2	Able to fully participate in casual conversations, express facts, give instructions, describe, report on, and provide narration about current, past, and future activities.	Concrete topics such as own background, family, interests, work, travel, and current events in informal settings.	Understandable to an NS not used to dealing with foreigners; sometimes miscommunicates.
1	Can create with the language; asks and answer questions; participate in short conversations.	Everyday survival topics and courtesy requirements.	Intelligible to an NS used to dealing with foreigners.
0	No functional ability.	None.	Unintelligible.
KEY: ENS = Educated Native Speaker NS = Native Speaker *May be job specific			

Figure 1. Trisection of Oral Proficiency Levels.

trates the speaking skills associated with each DLPT level.) Now a qualified Army linguist, she goes immediately to advanced individual training (AIT) at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca. During her four months at AIT, her language skills deteriorate as much as 25 percent. She no longer meets the Army language proficiency standards.

After AIT, Jenny returns to her National Guard unit, she gets a job, and enrolls in college. She takes Arabic courses in college and brings her language proficiency back up to the Army's minimum qualification standard of level 2. Jenny is a good soldier and is promoted to the rank of sergeant about the same time she graduates from college.

As she continues her military career, Jenny attends Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) courses, assumes additional administrative and leadership duties, and participates in several major exercises. Her language proficiency begins to deteriorate. As Jenny continues to assume more military and civilian responsibilities, her language proficiency continues to diminish. Her language proficiency again falls below the Army minimum standard.

Maintaining Language Proficiency

This fictional story illustrates the Army's problem of maintaining a pool of qualified linguists. Jenny represents a typical Reserve Component (RC) linguist. Many linguists throughout the RC and the entire Department of Defense do not meet minimum proficiency standards. A December 1994 report by the National Security and International Affairs Division of the General Accounting Office states that about one third of DLI graduates have not attained the minimum language proficiency of level 2. Following DLI, students routinely proceed to technical schools where they commonly experience a decline in proficiency by as much as 25 percent.

Unlike Jenny, many linguists never regain their language proficiency after AIT. Like Jenny, many linguists continue to decline in proficiency throughout their careers. In a 1986 study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University, Kurt Miller stated that the most neglected area in language training is that of skill maintenance. He said that the expectation for a soldier with minimal proficiency in a language to improve his skill in independent study or voluntary off-duty classes is unrealistic.

The average military linguist cannot maintain language skills using only training available while on duty. Individuals who spend the time and energy to learn a foreign language are usually highly motivated and have the desire to maintain that skill, but other priorities in life make it very difficult. Maintaining language skills requires a great deal of dedication.

Much of the work, time, and effort used to maintain a language comes from personal means. Time and energy devoted to language study is often taken from family and social activities. This is especially true in the RC where only 39 training days are available each year to accomplish the Army's training and administrative requirements. Compounding this lack of training time is the fact that many RC linguists are located great distances from language training facilities.

The **FM 34-1** intelligence training principle *"Maintain Proficiency"* addresses this problem. This training principle identifies several keys to maintaining language proficiency:

☐ Establish consistent approaches to collective and individual training.

☐ Conduct training at a baseline proficiency level consistent with unit readiness standards.

☐ Use creative techniques and ideas to keep the soldier interested.

☐ Challenge the soldier to go beyond the Army standard.

☐ Use the Readiness Training (REDTRAIN) program.

☐ Provide live environment training (LET).

☐ Use available learning opportunities and language courses.

Consistent Approaches

Consistency is one of the most important items in learning and maintaining a foreign language. Language skills are highly perishable and must be used frequently or proficiency will deteriorate. Good language maintenance programs have linguists doing some language activity on a daily basis. The activities could include listening to a language tape in the car, reading for 15 to 20 minutes a day, or reviewing vocabulary cards while waiting for a bus.

A prerequisite for establishing consistency is knowing the capabilities and motivation of each soldier. The target for language difficulty in training is just beyond the soldier' s current capabilities.

A key to consistent language study is motivation. A few soldiers are self-motivated enough to maintain language skills at almost any cost, others need incentives. Positive incentives for soldiers include proficiency pay and missions or assignments to countries using the target language. Competition in language olympics motivates many linguists. If language training is challenging and exciting, the training itself becomes a positive incentive. Positive incentives usually do more to encourage language study than negative ones like taking away privileges when the skill level is lower than desired.

Consistency does not mean using the same method for every training period. Adult learning theory suggests that while variety is needed to retain the learner's interest, effective learning occurs

when there is a consistent application of standards. Here are some additional ideas to establish a consistent training approach:

- ☐ Write concrete objectives for each training period based on the individual's or section's abilities.
- ☐ Demand high standards for the final objective. Initially, this may require establishing intermediate objectives that gradually increase the difficulty of the task until the final training objective is met.
- ☐ Always insist on mastery of one objective before going on to the next.
- ☐ Make the training as realistic as possible. Do not conduct all language training in a classroom or language lab. Take the soldiers to the field or try something like performing preventive maintenance on a vehicle using only the target language.
- ☐ Ensure the soldier understands how to apply the cultural or linguistic lesson in a real situation.
- ☐ Insist that linguists use only the target language during language training.
- ☐ Take advantage of opportunities to perform hip-pocket language training.

Baseline Proficiency

When talking about a baseline proficiency of level 2, it is important to understand that the length of time and knowledge necessary to progress from one proficiency level to the next increases with every level. See Figures 1 and 2. For example, if it takes six months to reach level 2, it may take several years of constant exposure to reach level 3. The time required to attain and maintain a level 2 proficiency varies because the difficulty levels of languages differ. Basic courses for many Romance languages take 26 weeks while more difficult languages like Arabic take up to 63 weeks.

The Japanese language is a good example of how the degree of difficulty increases with each level of proficiency. Japanese uses over 1500 Chinese characters, each having multiple meanings. Knowledge of all of the characters is not required to reach level 2, but combinations of characters and meanings will total several thousand facts that a linguist must remember to maintain the minimum standard.

Baseline proficiency aligns with another training principle *"Use Appropriate Doctrine"* outlined in **FM 25-100, Training the Force.** Using appropriate doctrine goes beyond training language at a minimum proficiency level. Training to standard provides a basis for common vocabulary and military literacy across the force. When a RC linguist is called up to support another unit, there is no time to learn nonstandard vocabulary, doctrines, or procedures. All of the soldiers training

must be done to Army standards, including common soldier tasks, survival skills, and military occupational speciality (MOS) skills. Linguists must know and understand Army doctrine and how it applies to the linguist's target area.

Techniques and Ideas

Creative techniques add interest and keep enthusiasm high. A good language trainer will find ways to make training come alive. For example, Captain Leland K. Jensen created a board game to support unit language training while attached to the 300th MI Brigade (Linguist), Utah National Guard. The game included cultural and historical background information unique to people who speak the target language. Through the game, soldiers studied the unique historical and cultural aspects of the target language country. They also learned military tactics and vo-


Figure 2. Inverted Pyramid of Language Proficiency.

KEY:
P = Pronunciation
F/I = Fluency / Integrative
SL/C = Social Linguistics / Culture
G = Grammar
V = Vocabulary
T = Task

cabulary in a fun and interesting way. The following are other examples of how to make training interesting:

☐ Use a scenario-based approach to language training. Company language trainers can develop simple human, signals, and counterintelligence scenarios. By using scenarios and role-playing, soldiers are able to practice MI skills while learning and honing language skills.

☐ Conduct common tasks training and other routine military training in the target language. This type of training works well when all members of the section are at least the Army minimum language proficiency level.

These creative training approaches provide a fun and effective way to practice language skills. When training is fun and challenging, the training itself is highly motivating. Soldiers will often spend time at home studying and improving language skills so they can do better at the next training session.

Challenge the Soldier

"Train To Challenge" is another **FM 25-100** principle that is a key to maintaining language proficiency. Intellectually and physically challenging training excites and motivates both soldiers and leaders. Successful completion of demanding training breeds success in the next training effort. It leads to competent and confident soldiers by building new skills. Training that tests and stretches the soldier's ability can be a key to retaining good soldiers and linguists by instilling loyalty, dedication, and excellence.

Integrating language training into other training activities can challenge a linguist's abilities. It takes more time and effort to plan and conduct the training in the target language, but the benefits are worth the extra time and effort. Consider a section of five Chinese linguists training on a common soldier skill such as using a signal operating instruction. The first challenge is to translate the material into Chinese, which provides opportunities for the trainer to learn or review essential military vocabulary. The next challenge is presenting the material to the section, especially if some linguists are below the Army's minimum fluency standard. One approach is to have a member of the team interpret the information back into English as the trainer presents it. This provides practice for the interpreter and keeps the other linguists interested. The student translates it to themselves, to see if they would say it the same way. If the interpreter stumbles on a word or phrase, other members of the section can help. The soldiers can ask questions and answer them in either Chinese or English but need to be translated to the other language as well.

Training a common soldier task in the target language provides many challenges for the linguist soldier. The following are some of the potential benefits:

☐ Common task training becomes challenging, even if the subject is dull.

☐ Language training is more meaningful and has higher retention.

☐ Every individual practices language skills during the training.

☐ Linguists learn and use military technical vocabulary in a realistic setting.

☐ Soldiers often retain the common task skill better because there is more interaction and effort used.

☐ Linguists typically consider this type of training fun and interesting.

Readiness Training

The REDTRAIN program provides training opportunities to improve and maintain intelligence and language skills of soldiers and units. This program is quite flexible and allows the com-

mander to be innovative and creative in getting the most bang for the buck. A few examples illustrate how the REDTRAIN program provides excellent training opportunities:

☐ Members of the 141st MI Battalion (Linguist), Utah National Guard, recently used the REDTRAIN program to attend the Worldwide Language Olympics. The soldiers attending the olympics were excited and enthusiastic to compete. In addition, they improved their language proficiency as they prepared to go to the event. Probably the greatest benefit was from the language training ideas and contagious enthusiasm they brought back to the unit.

☐ The program funds language instructors during weekend drills of National Guard linguists. The instructors customize the classes to address specific weaknesses that the language program managers and commanders identified. The REDTRAIN program can also supplement the customized instruction by providing dictionaries and other commercial language materials.

Another program, developed by the 141st MI Battalion and funded through REDTRAIN, is the Language Enhancement Course (LEC). The battalion designed the LEC from the ground up as a language maintenance and enhancement program for linguists to use at home during the interval between drill assembles. The best linguists in each language developed a LEC program for the target language. Most LECs use existing commercial materials but have unique approaches to using the material. Each soldier completes the lessons at home and corrects them at the next drill. Each lesson builds on concepts presented in the previous lesson. For example, if the first lesson has ten concepts then the second lesson will have most of the first ten plus new ones.

Live Environment Training

When many of us think of LET for linguists, we think of an overseas assignment or mission. These assignments are great and provide a wonderful opportunity to practice and maintain language skills if we make the most of them. When a linguist supports an exercise in a foreign country, the supported unit needs to provide as many opportunities as possible for the linguist to interact with native speakers.

On a mission to support an exercise in Japan, several Japanese linguists learned that they could visit a nearby town only once or twice during their three weeks in Japan. According to the exercise schedule, the linguists were supporting the exercise on four evenings. The supported unit commander had instituted a very strict pass policy to prevent problems with the local populace. The officer in charge of the linguist section explained that the linguists had a secondary mission of maintaining fluency in Japanese. The best way to do this was to visit the nearby town and talk to the Japanese people. Once the commander understood the importance of visiting the Japanese town, he allowed the linguists to go on pass whenever they were free from exercise duties.

Other opportunities for LET include festivals showcasing the cultures associated with the target language. Many communities have large numbers of people who speak the target language. When festivals or celebrations take place, linguists can meet native speakers. The military linguists can get involved in community activities and maintain language proficiency. An example of getting involved in the community is a Spanish linguist section translating information pamphlets for the National Committee for Prevention of Child Abuse. Soldiers often get so excited helping a good cause that much of the work is done at home on the soldier's free time. Another Spanish section provided language support for a symposium put on by the Utah Governor's Office for Hispanic Affairs.

Sometimes LET just seems to happen. The language trainer must be ready to take advantage of any situation. A Russian section in the National Guard was training on drill weekend. One member of the section learned of a Russian patient at a local hospital receiving a unique medical procedure. The section leader obtained permission from the commander and the hospital to take several members of the section to meet with this patient. The hospital appreciated the linguists' help because the patient spoke very little English. Because the treatment took several months, there were many opportunities for members of the section to provide a service and improve their language skills.

Opportunities and Courses

Many language training materials and courses are available from colleges, universities, and DLI. By using some ingenuity, the commander and language program manager can have courses customized for specific requirements. Both military and civilian agencies can provide these type courses. For example, the U.S. Army Forces Command contracts with Brigham Young University in Utah for three language refresher courses each year. The Language Lab at Fort Lewis, Washington, offers courses throughout the year that can be a valuable tool for soldiers trying to increase language proficiency.

The Satellite Communications for Learning (SCOLA) system is another source of language training. SCOLA offers newscasts and other information in a variety of languages. The material is always current and usually very interesting. SCOLA allows linguists to keep up with foreign news, cultural events, and special changes in their target language countries. The language trainer or linguist can also videotape the programs for use at a more convenient time.

Keys to Proficiency

The keys to maintaining and enhancing language proficiency are to be consistent and to know the linguist's capabilities. Set goals which challenge the student and aim at the level 2 proficiency. Enforce Army standards in all training. Use creative techniques to motivate, excite, and reward soldiers. Remember, linguists want to have very high language proficiency, but it takes a great deal of time and effort. If we are diligent in helping linguists maintain those hard-earned language skills, Jenny's story can be more like this.

Jenny just graduated from DLI with a level 2 proficiency in Arabic. She goes on to AIT where, in addition to learning a new MOS, she spends several hours a week in a language lab maintaining her language skills. As part of her AIT she spends several days in a field training exercise where she performs her new MOS skills in her target language.

When she completes AIT she returns to her National Guard unit and enrolls in college. Through a combination of training provided by the Army and her college language courses, she improves her language proficiency to a level 3. Because of the motivation and training opportunities provided by her unit, she completes her career while maintaining high language proficiency.

Major Darrell W. Bott is a liaison officer with the 141st MI Battalion (Linguist), 300th MI Brigade (Linguist), Utah Army National Guard. He has an extensive background in training including 14 years assigned to MI linguist units and seven years as a training specialist for Thiokol Corporation, a major defense contractor. He earned a bachelor's degree from Weber State University and a master's in Instructional Technology from Utah State University. You can reach him at his civilian workplace at commercial (801) 863-5715.

ICE-X 1995

by Captain Robert B. Walter

It is April 1995, and Iraq is starting to feel the full effects of the sanctions that the United Nations imposed following the Gulf War. With civil unrest mounting and assassination attempts increasing, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein is desperate for a solution to help relieve the pressure. In a daring move, he sends some of his ground forces south towards the Kuwaiti border, again threatening the sovereignty of that small nation. The United States responds swiftly and surely, mobilizing air, sea, and ground forces in a demonstration of resolve against further aggression. As part of the U. S. Army's III Corps deployment, the 163d Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion (Tactical Exploitation), 504th MI Brigade, is soon on its way to Kuwait, prepared to conduct its human intelligence (HUMINT) and counterintelligence (CI) missions.

This scenario was the basis for the annual Interrogation, CI, and Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Exercise (ICE-X) held at Fort Hood, Texas, from 15 to 25 May 1995. For the soldiers of Company A, 163d MI Battalion, the ICE-X was the pinnacle of the yearly training plan. The ICE-X provided very thorough and realistic training to each soldier and addressed all of the company's mission essential task list (METL) objectives. The planning, rehearsal, and execution of a myriad of tasks provided Company A and other ICE-X participants with a number of valuable lessons on CI and EPW operations. These lessons greatly en-

hanced the company's ability to maintain its intelligence readiness and execute its wartime mission. The following are just a few of the many lessons from ICE-X 1995.

Exercise Scope

Hosted by the 163d MI Battalion, ICE-X 1995 proved to be an excellent exercise, one that offered realistic training on multiple facets of HUMINT, CI, and EPW operations. During the five-day exercise, more than 850 soldiers and marines from thirteen military police (MP) and MI units worked together to control, process, and interrogate nearly 1000 EPW cases. They achieved this volume by recycling more than 200 EPW role-players through division EPW holding facilities and the corps holding area (CHA). Additional role-players portrayed local officials, nationals, and CI sources. These players, scattered throughout the corps rear area, supported CI agents and teams in the CI force protection source operations (CFSO) portion of the exercise.

Scenario Development

A great deal of planning went into the ICE-X to ensure each unit would meet its training objectives. Company A used real-world Iraqi order of battle information and their actions of October 1994 to create a realistic scenario for the five-day exercise. The scenario development process included breaking each day into six-hour blocks and each Iraqi division or brigade into a battalion- or company-sized unit. Once planners established the scenario, dedi-

cated interrogation and CI script writers spent roughly 12 hours a day for three months creating individual roles. In the end, the writers produced over 500 interrogation and 200 CI roles for the exercise. They based each role on real-world data and synchronized it with the scenario.

The mission-oriented nature of the exercise helped Company A and other participants enhance individual and unit readiness. The ICE-X provided each soldier with a better understanding of Iraqi units and their capabilities. The scripted scenario also enabled trainers to evaluate each soldier's interrogation or interview skills by comparing the reported information to the scripted information.

Ramp-up Exercises

While preparing for the ICE-X, Company A conducted several smaller exercises, each addressing specific areas within the company's METL. One such ramp-up exercise was a week-long CFSO exercise in the latter part March 1995. This exercise introduced many of the company's CI agents to overt source operations. The agents learned how to execute the entire spectrum of source operations. They conducted liaison with role players acting as local national officials or sources and held source meetings in local establishments. The CI agents learned how to use intelligence contingency funds, surveillance and countersurveillance equipment, and interpreters to support CI operations. As most of the role players were language quali-

fied, the company's CI agents had to use interrogators as interpreters during many of the source meetings. The CFSO exercise used the same real-world data as that developed for the ICE-X and, therefore, served as a preliminary to the actual exercise.

Company A also conducted two interrogation exercises prior to the ICE-X. These exercises prepared interrogators to conduct all facets of interrogation operations from EPW screening, interrogation, and document exploitation to using unique unit automation and communications equipment. Language training focused specifically on the Southwest Asia area of operations and prepared interrogators for the ICE-X and its contingency missions. The majority of the interrogations were conducted in target languages of Russian and Arabic.

MP and MI Doctrine

One interesting lesson learned while preparing for the ICE-X was the differences between MP and MI doctrine on the physical set-up of the CHA and the Corps Interrogation Facility (CIF). The 411th MP Company, 720th MP Battalion, established and guarded the CHA during the ICE-X. Representatives from the 411th MP Company and Company A, 163d MI Battalion, discussed the layout of the facility in great detail during our initial coordination meetings. The MPs pointed out that **FM 19-4, MP Operations**, has the MPs occupying about 90 percent of the CHA with the CIF in one small corner. We argued that this set-up was not adequate for our purposes and referred the MPs to **FM 34-52, Interrogation Operations**. **FM 34-52** gives MI plenty of room for

the CIF, about 65 percent of the CHA, and the MPs the remaining 35 percent. The MPs argued that the **FM 34-52** set-up did not provide adequate space for and proper control of the EPWs. Eventually we reached the compromise depicted in Figure 1 below. This arrangement gave the MPs enough room for their EPW requirements and MI adequate space for interrogation operations. The compromise CHA worked very well during the ICE-X. It will eventually become the standard CHA and CIF set-up in the III Corps tactical standing operating procedure.

Corps Holding Area Operations

A good rehearsal is a key element to the success of any operation. This was definitely true for ICE-X 1995. Company A and the 411th MP Com-

Figure 1. ICE-X 1995 Corps Holding Area.

KEY:
IHA   - Initial Hold Area
INSP - Inspection
INTG - Interrogation

L   - Latrine
EPW   - Enemy Prisoner of War
MKT   - Mobile Kitchen Trailer
WT   - Water Trailer

SEN   - Small Extension Node
GEN   - Generator
TRL   - Trailer
SCR   - Screening

pany conducted a quick rehearsal after deploying to North Fort Hood and establishing the CHA. The rehearsal showed there were some issues the MI and MP companies still needed to work out. First, the MPs realized that the initial hold area was not large enough for the expected volume of prisoners. The companies expanded the initial hold area, a solution that proved adequate during the ICE-X.

Second, the rehearsal demonstrated that more interrogators were needed as interpreters to assist the MPs during EPW inprocessing. This caused some concern for us, mainly because screening operations would be much slower due to the loss of personnel. This delay would only further exacerbate the MP's difficulty in quickly processing the EPWs into the holding areas. The rehearsal, however, showed that our fear was unfounded. In fact, increasing the number of interrogators supporting inprocessing actually led to a quicker turn-around time from screening to interrogation. The interrogators at the inprocessing station completely screened the prisoners prior to their reaching the CIF screening tent. This helped the interrogation operations section identify the prisoners needing interrogation sooner.

An additional benefit was the close working relationship which developed between interrogation teams and MP squads. Although commanders from both companies planned the CHA operation, it was the MI and MP soldiers that worked out the kinks in the procedures and made the operation a success.

Reserve Component Integration

We learned a great number of lessons during the execution phase of the exercise. One key lesson was how to effectively integrate Reserve Component (RC) soldiers into the operation. The 301st MI Battalion, U.S. Army Reserve, provided many of the CI agent augmentees on the teams. Louisiana National Guardsmen from the 415th MI Battalion (Linguist) provided additional inter-

rogators. These soldiers came with varying abilities and levels of knowledge. In order to effectively maximize each soldier's potential, Company A integrated the RC soldiers into all facets of the operations. The RC soldiers worked side by side with Active Component soldiers, rather than isolated in separate RC-only teams or shifts. After a short train-up time, most of the RC soldiers were able to conduct operations effectively, some even outdistancing their Active Component counterparts. By the end of the exercise, it was difficult to tell whether an Active or RC soldier had prepared a report.

Role-Player Training

Role-player training was another area that had a direct impact on the success of the ICE-X. Company A established and operated a Role-Players' Academy during the first three days of the exercise. During those three days, role-players received classes on the laws of war, the Geneva Convention, and what it is like to be an EPW. In addition, the linguist role players received time to prepare their roles in the target language, therefore, making them more effective as EPWs and enhancing the overall training value of the exercise.

Conclusion

The III Corps ICE-X 1995 was a tremendous training opportunity for all soldiers to hone their warfighting skills. The 1995 exercise met the corps' goals of working the corps and below HUMINT and CI system. ICE-X 1996 will bring theater-level assets into the scenario, allowing us to identify and resolve incompatibilities of equipment and doctrine. We are looking forward to ICE-X 1996 and hope to see you there!

Captain Robert B. Walter is currently attending the Combined Arms and Services Staff School. He was the commander of Company A, 163d MI Battalion (Tactical Exploitation), at Fort Hood, Texas, and has served as an S2 in both the 7th Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Division. Captain Walter is a 1987 graduate of the University of Colorado.

CFSO Course Now Available!

The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) completed the validation process for the Army's first course on counterintelligence force protection source operations (CFSO). The CFSO course (3C-F17/244-F9) will teach counterintelligence agents and interrogators the advanced skills needed to meet the requirements of **AR 381-172**, CFSO, and Low Level Source Operations.

Course Content

The six-week course at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, consists of three phases:

☐ First Phase: One week of platform instruction that teaches basic doctrine and uses of CFSO, mission analysis and planning, the operational cycle, operations security, and reporting.

☐ Second Phase: Four-week scenario-based practical exercise. Students conduct CFSO with the assistance and advice of the instructors (one instructor to every two students).

☐ Third Phase - One-week graded situational training exercise without instructor assistance.

Prerequisites

The CFSO course is open to Active Component commissioned, warrant, and noncommissioned officers in counterintelligence and interrogator military occupational specialties (MOSs). Other course prerequisites are—

☐ U.S. citizen with a valid SECRET clearance.

☐ Hold MOS 97B, 97E, 351B, 351E, or 35E.

☐ Assigned, or on orders, to a position requiring CFSO training.

☐ Be a promotable sergeant, or above, and a Basic NCO Course graduate.

☐ Score 2 or higher in listening, reading, and speaking on the Defense Language Proficiency Test if in MOS 97E.

☐ Score of 89 or higher on the Defense Language Aptitude Battery if in MOS 97B.

Class Dates

Contact your training manager if interested in the CFSO course. The Fiscal Year 1996 class dates are—

Class 001	3 Oct 95 - 16 Nov 95
Class 002	9 Jan 96 - 22 Feb 96
Class 003	27 Feb 96 - 9 Apr 96
Class 004	16 Apr 96 - 29 May 96
Class 005	11 Jun 96 - 24 Jul 96
Class 006	13 Aug 96 - 25 Sep 96

USAIC&FH Point Of Contact

CW3 George, DSN 821-1294 or commercial (520) 533-1294.

Training for the Future:
Operations Other Than War

**by First Lieutenant
Carolyn F. Belveal**

The possibility of a massive ground war in Europe declined significantly with the collapse of communism in Europe and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. This change did not, however, reduce the potential for conflict in the region. New threats and missions continue to challenge the soldiers of the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Now, USAREUR is not only training its units to perform conventional ground combat operations for war but also to conduct operations other than war (OOTW). This article describes how the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) trains commanders and military intelligence (MI) professionals to adapt to the new missions and dynamic situations of OOTW.

Combat Maneuver Training Center

OOTW is now a significant part of training at the CMTC near Hohenfels, Germany. The CMTC has designed new scenarios that replicate the real-world experiences and missions of USAREUR. A battalion task force now spends the first four days of its ten-day exercise in an OOTW environment. On the fourth day, the battalion task force transitions to conventional combat operations. The CMTC training prepares the task force for many of the situations it could face in Macedonia or Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Task Force Operations

In the CMTC OOTW scenario, a battalion task force must clear and occupy a zone of separation between two hostile countries. It must—

☐ Construct and occupy observation posts and check points.

☐ Aid the local population.

☐ Interpret the rules of engagement for various incidents.

OOTW consists of small unit actions that depend upon company grade officers and noncommissioned officers to accomplish the mission. OOTW puts first-line supervisors in the spotlight because they must understand how to handle searches, random encounters with military factions, and deal with the press. The soldiers on the ground are responsi-

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1. What is the relationship of the village with surrounding villages?

☐ Are they related?

☐ Do they support each other or are they hostile toward each other?

☐ Is any portion of the population discriminated against?

2. What is the food and water status of the village?

☐ Where do they get their food?

☐ What other means of subsistence are available?

☐ What is the status of their crops and herds?

☐ What is the quality of their water source?

3. What is the medical status of the village?

☐ What services are available in the villages?

☐ Where are the nearest medical facilities?

☐ Is there evidence of illness, disease, or starvation?

☐ What portion of the population is affected?

☐ What is the death rate?

4. What civilian organizations exist in the village?

☐ Who are their leaders?

☐ What leadership element does the general population seem to support or trust the most?

☐ Which group has control?

5. What is the security situation in the village?

☐ What elements are the sources of problems?

☐ What types and quantities of weapons are in the village?

☐ Where are the minefields?

☐ What is the size of any transient population in the village?

☐ Where did the transients come from? How long have they been there?

6. Where are the refugees originally from?

7. What is the size of the original population?

8. What is the size of the refugee population?

9. Why did they come here?

Figure 1. Area Assessment Checklist.

ble for reporting information while the S2 and his intelligence analysts summarize the information and look for emerging patterns. The task force uses this information in area assessments for the United Nations. (See Figure 1.)

The battalion task force commander assigns each subordinate company an area of operations within the zone of separation. The company commanders establish checkpoints and observation posts within the zone. They use checkpoints along the major routes to stop and question anyone traveling across the zone. Often soldiers at the checkpoints must detain vehicles carrying contraband and decide how to deal with the smugglers. Observation posts allow the commanders to monitor and record the activity within the sector. Even if the activity seems routine, the soldier must record the event and report the information to the next higher echelon—change in routine is sometimes more important than new activity.

The task force commander is responsible for liaison with the villagers within his area of the zone. Each village usually includes a leader or mayor and a religious figure. Common complaints from the villages include lack of food and potable water, military vehicles speeding through villages, and threats from faction groups. How the task force and company commanders deal with a village's requests directly relates to how the village views U.S. military intervention. The task force commander may direct that a platoon or squad escort food and supply convoys to the population centers to ensure they arrive safely.

In addition to coping with the population, the task force deals with incidents instigated by one of the many factions operating within the zone of separation. Car bombings, mine fields, weapons caches, distribution of propaganda, sniping, ambushes on convoys, and mortar fire are some of the incidents that occur. Determining which faction is responsible for the incident enables the commander to warn his soldiers about hostile groups and actions.

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1. Did you encounter any belligerents during the convoy?
- ☐ Size
- ☐ Activity
- ☐ Location
- ☐ Unit/uniform
- ☐ Time
- ☐ Equipment

2. Were there any changes in road conditions?
- ☐ Where are the mines, potholes, road craters, etc.?

3. Were there any thefts from convoys?
- ☐ Where did this happen (Items taken, description of thief, action taken, etc.)?

4. Were there any acts of violence directed towards the convoy?
- ☐ Where did these happen (aiming of weapons, type of weapons, rock throwing, number of personnel, etc.)?

5. Were there any shots fired at or around the convoy?
- ☐ Where did this happen (type of weapons, number of personnel, action taken, casualties, etc.)?

6. Were there any incidents of convoys being stopped or harassed by roadblocks?
- ☐ Where did this happen (number of personnel, nature of incident, action taken, etc.)?

Figure 2. Convoy Checklist.

Coordinating Civil-Military Operations

The brigade staff synchronizes daily events through a nightly civil-military humanitarian assistance and operational support (CHAOS) meeting. Held in the brigade tactical operations center, the CHAOS meeting brings together key brigade staff personnel and task force representatives to discuss issues and concerns. The brigade S2, S3, and chaplain are members of CHAOS. Representatives from civil affairs, judge advocate general, military police, and the direct support MI company are also present at the CHAOS meeting.

On the final day of the OOTW scenario, a Civil-Military Working Group meets to discuss pressing issues. The working group's meeting is the culmination point of the OOTW phase of the CMTC exercise. Similar to the brigade CHAOS meeting, this meeting includes brigade and task force commanders, village mayors, and faction leaders. Chaired by the battalion task force commander, the working group's agenda covers U.S. military operations, faction activity, and civilian

humanitarian needs within the zone of separation. The task force commander listens to everyone's concerns and acts as the mediator. The Civil-Military Working Group meeting is a success if all parties agree to abide by the rules for the zone of separation.

Brigade Intelligence Support

The brigade S2 compiles incident reports, faction recognition guides, and capabilities assessments. These products help the task force soldiers understand the threat and the area of operations. The S2 also publishes various checklists that standardize reporting procedures. (See Figure 2.) These assist the soldier in providing complete and accurate reports. From these reports, the S2 more easily pieces together emerging patterns. In OOTW, accuracy is often more critical then the timeliness of reports.

By implementing a sound collection and dissemination plan, the brigade S2 can help the task force succeed in OOTW. The S2 can employ a number of organic and supporting assets to collect information.

The counterintelligence and interrogation teams from the direct support MI company are collectors that can visit the villages, talk with the local civilians, and gather information. Monitoring activity in the villages and the mood of the local populace allows the S2 to piece together single events that alone may seem insignificant but together may reveal a threat to the task force. The CHAOS meetings also provide an excellent forum for revealing emerging patterns and tasking assets to answer the commander's priority intelligence requirements. Observation posts, checkpoints, and patrol reports, particularly those following checklist formats, are another source of valuable information.

Tailored Intelligence Products

OOTW requires the S2 to apply standard techniques and processes to produce tailored intelligence products. For example, the S2 should still develop a modified combined obstacles overlay (MCOO). The S2 must, however, tailor the observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach factors to the OOTW situation. One product taken from the basic MCOO is a lines of communication overlay. This overlay helps the commander visualize the network of trails within the zone of separation that refugees may travel or smugglers may use to infiltrate the zone. It also helps the commander determine where to establish his checkpoints and observation posts to cover the most traveled routes.

The All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) remote workstation is an extremely helpful tool for developing tailored products. The workstation enables the analyst to automate the daily journal, correlate information to find patterns, perform terrain analysis, and disseminate intelligence. The S2 analyst can sort the system's database by factions to determine which faction has a history of repeated smuggling activity. Lastly, the analyst can program the workstation to alert upon the arrival

Figure 3. Checkpoint Line-of-Sight Overlay.

of reports containing critical intelligence or specific information.

One of the most useful ASAS remote workstation products is the line-of-sight overlay. Figure 3 is an example of a line-of-sight overlay. The overlay helps the S2 develop his reconnaissance and surveillance plans by identifying potential observation post locations and deadspace. This helps the S2 determine which observation posts and checkpoints must be relocated or replaced by patrols. Since the workstation software takes into account only elevation, not vegetation. It is important that the commander controlling that checkpoint or observation post verifies the line-of-sight overlay.

Conclusion

Training soldiers in OOTW is critical and more relevant in today's world. Exposing our soldiers to non-traditional operations in training better prepares them for future OOTW missions. The CMTC at Hohenfels, Germany, is working diligently with USAREUR units like the 3d Infantry Division and our NATO partners to develop realistic training that ensures U.S. Forces are prepared to meet the new challenges of OOTW.

First Lieutenant Belveal is currently the Assistant S2, 3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, Vilseck, Germany. She is a 1993 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York.

Welcome to the
Big League

by Sergeant First Class
Nicholas Rozumny

In football, it is the preseason, for a Warfighter Exercise it is the Warfighter Seminar. No matter what the activity, putting together a winning team requires a focused training effort prior to actual competition. During training, coaches, managers, and leaders—

☐ Define their strategies.

☐ Synchronize their offense and defense.

☐ Learn the strengths and weaknesses of their teams and those of the competition.

With this information in hand, they then set out on the path that will lead to success in their respective endeavors.

In warfighting, the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) Warfighter Seminar provides division and corps commanders the opportunity to develop their plans for success that they and their staffs will execute during a Warfighter Exercise. Prior to executing a BCTP Warfighter Exercise, commanders and their staffs participate in the Warfighter Seminar at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The purpose of the seminar is to prepare for the rigors and scrutiny of the BCTP Warfighter Exercise by—

☐ Uniting the commander with his primary staff and major subordinate commanders.

☐ Conducting workshops and exercises that focus on decisionmaking and synchronizing tactical operations.

☐ Enhancing team-building.

☐ Improving the commander's understanding of current doctrine and tactics.

Team Trainers

The BCTP staff has developed specific training objectives for each unit that participates in a seminar. The objectives focus on allowing a commander and his staff to enhance their understanding of the decisionmaking process and associated command and control procedures. The BCTP staff also wants to help units—

☐ Gain insights into the application of Army doctrine, as it applies to operations.

☐ Achieve a common understanding of the commander's leadership style and intent.

☐ Develop an understanding of the commander's critical information requirements.

☐ Enhance staff coordination.

Team Goals

As expected, player units have their own goals to achieve by the seminar's end. It is critical for units to identify and make all seminar attendees aware of the specific goals prior to beginning the seminar. One of the 2d Armored Division's goals during its Warfighter Seminar in March 1995, was for the division and the BCTP staff to lay the ground work for the introduction of Force XXI initiatives into the division's Warfighter Exercise in January 1996. The division will begin to incorporate aspects of the digitized battle staff into its operations during that exercise— the division's first since its designation as the Experimental Force XXI. As the Army's Experimental Force XXI, the 2d Armored Division will conduct the Brigade Advanced Warfighting Experiment in February 1997.

Playing Field

BCTP provides a playing field that gives units maximum leeway in meeting their goals. The training facilities include classrooms that the unit can subdivide further into four smaller classrooms. With these accommodations, division and corps staffs can gather in small groups or into larger groups as necessary. The classrooms have mapboards, closed-circuit televisions, and all the tables and chairs necessary.

Although participating units must take their own supplies to Fort Leavenworth, the BCTP staff does provide a limited amount of expendables. The BCTP staff can

also provide units with a limited number of computers and printers if coordination is made well in advance. The 2d Armored Division staff was able to use a BCTP computer to access home station E-mail while deployed to the seminar. Telephone communications with the home team will not be a problem as phones are installed throughout the classroom. With prior coordination, BCTP can also provide a facsimile machine.

The BCTP facilities also provide ample support for presentations of any kind. The facilities can accommodate any range of technology from simple butcher block briefings through graphic presentations taken directly from laptop computers. The BCTP staff can even provide its audiovisual support personnel to tape and televise briefings (coaches like nothing better than to review practice films after a scrimmage). As with any deployment, however, BCTP advises units to bring what they will need to succeed: laptop computers, laser printers, acetate, markers, transparencies, paper, and other office supplies.

Game Plan

Planning training regimens that develop and exercise the right skills is a skill itself. Proper planning for seminars requires the unit staff to focus on certain key points while at the home station that will help them make efficient use of their time while participating in the seminar.

Early identification of the area of operations and the enemy will lead to successful planning. Corps and division commanders normally make recommendations to the BCTP staff concerning their preference for both the area of operations (e.g., Korea, Southwest Asia, Central Europe) and opposing force (e.g., Central Front, Southern Front). The

BCTP staff will announce the general area of operations prior to the beginning of the seminar, but units will not know their exact areas of operation until receipt of their first operations order after arrival at Fort Leavenworth. Identification of the exercise area of operations will allow G2 personnel to order the proper map coverage. Units can save time if they bring assembled maps of the general area of operations to the seminar.

Knowing the general area of operations will also allow the division terrain team to create quality terrain products that familiarize the entire staff with the details of the terrain on which they will fight. Prior to the 2d Armored Division's seminar, the terrain technician produced the standard terrain analysis products (zones of entry, lines of communication, combined obstacles, elevation with aerial obstacles, and water resource overlays). He developed these overlays using standard database products, supplemented with information gained from hard copy LANDSAT satellite imagery received from Headquarters, U.S. Central Command. He also provided automated terrain support in the form of three dimensional (3-D) terrain visualization fly-through scenes made possible with the aid of a Silicon® graphics computer and the U.S. Army Topographic Engineer Center's Battlefield Terrain Visualization Software. The 3-D terrain fly-through is a valuable tool that commanders and planners can use to visit the terrain without ever going there. In addition, the terrain technician assembled a book of 1:50,000 scale map sheets which identified key terrain and other critical details. These books assisted not only the G2 staff but all division staff members as well.

Prior to the seminar, the BCTP staff will provide units with general information pertaining to the opposing force they will face. The BCTP staff will identify the opposing force and provide order

of battle information. They will not provide the enemy situation or disposition until they brief the operations order to the participating unit.

Armed with general information about the terrain and the enemy, the G2 team can begin some critical preparation. In order to prepare for the division's seminar, the order of battle (OB) technician requested several copies of the Southern Front OB from the BCTP opposing force representative and assembled enemy equipment handbooks and manuals. The division staff could not begin preparing an intelligence estimate nor could they conduct any mission analysis at their home station because they had no opposing force data. From the OB data, the technicians developed enemy artillery spreadsheets, prepared basic briefing charts and formulated automated synchronization sheets prior to deploying to the seminar. Although the technicians could not finalize these products prior to the receipt of an operations order, their existence served to streamline mission analysis during the seminar.

Editor's Note: See "The Intelligence Synchronization Sheet" by Major Greene and Captain Hood in the January-March 1995 issue of the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin.

Special Teams

Units will be ahead of the game in the Warfighter Seminar if they know which staff members to bring along to support the team at Fort Leavenworth. One key individual on the division staff who must go to the seminar is the electronic warfare (EW) officer. The seminar scenarios focus heavily on EW and units will suffer unless someone is present to coordinate EW. The EW

officer must become very familiar with the opposing force EW assets as listed in the Warfighter Seminar enemy OB. The division EW officer discovered, over the course of the seminar, that he had to work closely with the division collection manager so that the two could coordinate the Blue Force's EW activities with available friendly assets.

Playbook Tips

In order to maximize time spent on mission analysis and wargaming during the seminar, G2 and G3 planners can do several things at the home station. The first is to establish definitive rules of engagement for the wargaming process. Units unprepared for the time constraints of the Warfighter Seminar may waste valuable time arguing over attrition criteria during wargaming. One way to avoid lengthy wargaming sessions is to identify, prior to the seminar and in writing, criteria for the attrition and destruction of both friendly and enemy forces. For example, this can be done by determining the exact effect a certain obstacle will have on friendly and enemy forces or the attrition assessed to a motorized rifle battalion when attacked by a 155-mm howitzer battalion. Many products of this type have been developed. Be certain that yours corresponds to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 350-series on opposing forces. A precise matrix will help G3 and G2 planners avoid lengthy discussions over "how many of my guys killed how many of your guys."

Planners can also streamline mission coordination by developing an electronic database for the dissemination of requests for information (RFI). The 2d Armored Division staff found that by using one database on a laptop computer to post and receive answers for RFIs, no one staff member needed to be burdened with the responsibility to coordinate RFIs.

Play Ball

Soon after the unit arrives for the seminar, the BCTP team briefs the participating unit staff on the scenarios that will be the focus of their mission planning during the seminar. As with the terrain and enemy, division and corps commanders request the number and type of scenarios they want their staffs to work. Our division requested two scenarios, one offensive and one defensive scenario. Before the arrival of the division commander, the BCTP staff briefs the operations order for the first scenario to the division battle staff. The battle staff immediately begins mission analysis. While many staff members are finalizing mission analysis, the division commander attends workshops with his primary and special staff officers. These workshops provide a forum for discussion of warfighting issues.

If units decide to undertake two scenarios, they have to conduct mission analysis and planning for one current and one future mission simultaneously. The staff must complete the staff estimate process and brief the mission analysis to the commander who then issues his guidance to the staff. In this way the staff develops wargames, briefs courses of action, and turns the commander's decision into an operations order.

Developing enemy courses of action is the basis for planning. The G2's analysis and control element (ACE) needs to develop sketches of the enemy's playbook. Three personnel from the division's ACE developed these sketches for our seminar: the all-source intelligence section chief, his assistant, and an OB technician. It is important to remember that you are playing an away game. Prioritizing your time is important. The OB technician found it very useful to decide first what constitutes a score by the enemy (objectives and goals for strategic, operational, and tactical levels). Second, he quickly developed the enemy's game plan. This was done by drawing 8" x 11" sketches of the enemy's plays (courses of action) and options (branches and sequels) within each play. Being thorough and decisive yet not wasting time, he developed a thumbnail sketch, fully developing each play later. These sketches, marked "most likely" and "most dangerous", are the springboard for staff elements to conduct parallel planning. Other sketches are numbered in order of adoption. The OB technician posts the sketches on butcher block with the enemy's objectives and goals for strategic, operational, and tactical levels (scoring criteria) above. In addition, these sketches are a guide for the ACE to develop overlays and event analysis matrices. At the same time, the entire staff can become familiar with them. This should ensure overall focus.

As the developmental process continues, a playbook begins to emerge. This playbook can be divided by each battlefield operating system. It can include the enemy OB but not all the "X" and "O" information. Rather the playbook is an overview of the opposing force (fronts and divisions) that the division must face. Selected plays from the mission analysis briefing, course of action development briefing, and decision briefing can be invaluable references. The commander and the G2 should consider using this playbook.

The ACE must produce a number of labor intensive products such as avenues of approach, situational templates, courses of action, etc., for each scenario. Attempting to create the perfect graphic slide is the worst enemy

Force Protection: Integrating Civil Affairs and Intelligence

by Captain Lynda Snyder and
Captain David P. Warshaw

It is incumbent upon tactical intelligence professionals to understand the role of civil affairs personnel on today's multifaceted battlefield. Failure to do so could result in the loss of an asset that is critical to adequate intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and force protection during operations other than war.

According to **FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations,** civil-military operations are *"complexes of activities in support of military operations embracing the interaction between the military force and civilian authorities fostering the development of favorable emotions, attitudes, and behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups."* The overall civil affairs objectives are to minimize the negative effects of military operations on civilians and to enhance the U.S. military's effectiveness. The Intelligence Battlefield Operating System, according to **FM 34-8, Combat Commander's Handbook on Intelligence,** *"reduces uncertainty and risk to U.S. Forces and permits effective application of combat power."* When integrated during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, these two combat multipliers created a safer and more secure environment for the engineer forces deployed in Haiti.

Essayons—"Let Us Try"

The 20th Engineer Brigade (Combat) (Airborne), XVIII Airborne Corps, formed the nucleus of Task Force (TF) Castle, a joint engineer organization that established the largest deployment of engineer forces outside the continental United States since Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. TF Castle constructed base camps, improved the Haitian infrastructure, participated in humanitarian service projects, and assisted with the reestablishment of public services.

In order for TF Castle to accomplish its mission, the leadership realized that the TF needed to create a stable environment in which engineer units would have freedom of movement and access to critical engineer resources. After an arduous process of reconnaissance, surveillance, and negotiations with principal land owners and occupants of the village of Bon Repos, the TF settled into Base Camp Castle.

The process by which the TF selected this particular area north of Port-au-Prince for command and control of engineer forces was exceptional. Tactical civil affairs, combined with military intelligence (MI), ensured that the engineers would live and work in an environment conducive to protecting the force and accomplishing the mission.

What Is It Like There?

The Joint Task Force (JTF)-180 command emphasis required TF Castle leaders to know the mission and critical aspects of the battlefield environment. Initial analytical efforts focused on geographical, historical, and sociological aspects of Haiti. The S2, TF Castle, focused the four-step IPB process on factors that affect engineering efforts. These factors included the locations of engineer resources such as quarries, the effect of the rainy season on movement of heavy engineer equipment, and the possibility of Haitian mobs or civil unrest.

Prior to deployment, civil affairs specialists provided a thorough cultural briefing on Haiti to all members of TF Castle. This briefing included the most recent civil affairs area study of Haiti. Based past experience, the civil affairs specialists realized that a true understanding of the situation, one that would enable accurate analysis of potential sites, required them to interact with the population. Once on the ground, the TF Castle civil affairs team conducted an initial area assessment of proposed engineer locations and engineer projects. Civil affairs personnel along with 20th Engineer Brigade linguists canvassed the area to ensure the unit's transition to Base Camp Castle and the Bon Repos area was smooth and caused no friction between the U.S. Forces and the local community. They asked questions and informed the public of our intentions.

As a result of an aggressive command initiative to scour the area for a suitable base camp site and to gauge Haitian reaction to U.S. Army presence in the area, the TF commander made the decision to erect Base Camp Castle at Bon Repos. The commander considered several factors in selecting a site suitable for more than two engineer battalions' worth of equipment and personnel as well as the TF tactical operations center.

First, the discovery of a limestone quarry just north of Bon Re-

pos along the critical main supply route of National Route 100 led to a contractual agreement enabling the engineers to conduct the largest military quarry operation in an active theater since the Korean War. The quarry, operated 24 hours a day, was the key to base camp construction and road upgrades. It provided necessary crushed rock to form base camp foundations, construct 11 kilometers of new roads, and repair 14 kilometers of severely deteriorated roads. Given the proximity of the quarry to the base camp site and the role that the quarry played in the engineers' lives, the location of Base Camp Castle was a natural choice for command and control.

Second, the site contained a well that could be used as a source for potable water. Selecting a site that included a natural water source solved a critical Class I supply problem that every unit in the theater faced.

Third, the site bordered Route 100. Route 100 provided engineer units with a high speed, paved line of communication for moving heavy dump trucks filled with quarry materials and other heavy engineer equipment such as bulldozers. The route led straight to the critical JTF-180 command and control nodes of the international airport and the light industrial complex, which housed the JTF-180 headquarters.

In addition to these factors, the TF Castle area was less congested than sites within Port-au-Prince. This reduced the risk of accidents between TF equipment and the Haitian population.

Force Protection and Local Security

Since the quarry, the well, and Route 100 met the engineer task force's geographic requirements, the only other element that needed factoring into the selection equation was site security. Through information collected by tactical civil affairs direct support

Moving the old Bon Repos marketplace helped ensure good will between the Haitians and American engineer forces.

personnel and unit linguists, the command determined that the population of Bon Repos would be receptive to the engineers' presence. This situation allowed the TF to deploy and work in a low risk environment. Mission success depended upon our ability to gain the trust and understanding of Bon Repos residents.

Civil affairs teams were invaluable sources of basic demographic information about the local area through their considerable interaction with the Haitians. Their efforts produced a detailed area assessment which contained critical information such as the location of medical facilities, the availability of food, the composition of the town leadership, and the political orientation of the townspeople. The TF Castle S2 incorporated this information into the IPB process to determine potential threats to engineer forces.

The case of the Bon Repos marketplace emphasizes the critical role that civil affairs assets played in the engineer task force's ability to secure their area of operations. Since the site of the existing town market would be directly outside the main gate of the proposed base camp, vendors expressed concerns to the civil affairs team about the impact of troops operating in the town. Through constant dialogue and negotiations with the merchants and the town's leaders, the TF commander decided to build a

larger market down the road from the existing site. The engineers constructed a new access road from Route 100 to the new marketplace. The relocated market opened with a formal ceremony involving the TF Castle commander, local land owners, clergy, and police. In fact, the new market attracted approximately 150 more vendors than the original marketplace and increased the commerce of the town. By meeting the terms of the agreement to move the marketplace, the engineers established credibility with a population not accustomed to trusting uniformed personnel. This step proved crucial to ensuring the security of the engineer forces.

Once the engineers established Base Camp Castle, daily interaction between civil affairs personnel and Haitian residents helped the TF maintain a satisfactory security posture. The TF evaluated Haitian reaction to U.S. forces and engineer operations. The team also watched for any changes in the mood of the population. The marketplace served as a critical collection point for combat information. Constant coordination between the TF S2 and civil affairs leaders provided the S2 with information necessary to predict potential hazards to soldiers and projects. The S2 armed civil affairs teams with specific questions to ask locals to fill gaps in knowledge.

The Haiti quarry operation, the largest since the Korean War, proved critical to the engineers' success.

TF Castle not only collected information useful for force protection, but also made efforts to explain its mission to the Bon Repos residents to assure them that engineer units would do them no harm. This free exchange of information facilitated a positive and mutually beneficial relationship between engineers and residents. The Haitians felt extremely comfortable passing information concerning suspected weapons caches, potential troublemakers in the town, planned demonstrations and local gatherings, and the overall mood of the people. The aggressive interaction enabled the TF to proactively respond to negative feelings against its presence. The earned trust paid dividends as the TF regulated the population's perceptions of the U.S. intervention.

Need For Law and Order

Despite these efforts, engineers could not prevent the destruction of the local police outpost on the eve of President Jean Bertrand Aristide's return. The daily exchange of information between the U.S. military and the Haitians indicated that the local population did not have a problem with the police force. Based on detailed analysis, TF Castle considered that the police station might be in danger of destruction but determined that this was unlikely to occur. Its destruction created a new challenge for the TF as local nationals, viewing the Americans as the de facto law and order force in the area, gathered near the base camp and engineer work sites to lodge civil complaints and request protection. Through their presence in large numbers, the Haitians began to interfere with engineer work projects and jeopardize the accomplishment of the engineer endstate. The TF S2 and civil affairs leadership coordinated an effort to restore law and order by—

☐ Determining the root of the animosity between the residents and the police while convincing the Bon Repos leaders to take charge.

☐ Finding the policemen posted in Bon Repos and convincing them to return.

Local interaction proved successful in restoring a favorable environment for engineering work. Civil affairs personnel convinced the town leadership to hold a community meeting. Approximately 100 Bon Repos residents attended. A civil affairs team leader addressed the gathering to reiterate the engineers' mission in Bon Repos and stress to the Haitians that engineers are not law enforcement officials. Moreover, the team leader explained how to form a town council to solve problems and why the residents should cooperate with the Haitian police. A captain from the Bon Repos police station's higher headquarters also spoke to the assembly and addressed the citizen's concerns. The meeting proved extremely productive. The town agreed to elect a council and permit the orderly return of police who had fled the police station's destruction.

Civil affairs and MI efforts that resulted in the town meeting bolstered relations between the U.S. Forces and the Haitians. By understanding the community and its needs, the task force mediated misunderstandings and restored positive relations.

Engineer Adventure Ends

Through each step of the engineers' settlement of Base Camp Castle, from conception to site occupation to redeployment, MI and civil affairs elements stepped forward to work together to ensure that the our presence in Bon Repos would be in an environment conducive to protecting the force. This formed the bedrock for mission accomplishment, allowing the engineers to do more than anyone imagined in a 60-day span. The MI and civil affairs actions pursued by TF Castle not only contributed to the success of the engineers, but also greatly impacted the overall JTF-180 and Multinational Force mission of providing a safe and secure environment for the return of democracy to Haiti.

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Captain David P. Warshaw is currently the S2, 20th Engineer Brigade (Combat) (Airborne), XVIII Airborne Corps, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. His previous assignments include S2, 4th Battalion, 3d Air Defense Artillery Regiment, and platoon leader and company executive officer in the 103d MI Battalion, 3d Infantry Division. He earned a Bachelor of Science from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York.

Joint General Intelligence Training Architecture

by Edward A. Giarusso

The United States learned many lessons from the Gulf War. Lessons not only on doctrine and joint warfare but also on the importance of joint training in conducting joint warfare. The Joint General Intelligence Training Architecture is an outgrowth of the intelligence community's effort to better prepare Service personnel for joint operations and assignments.

Background

Analysis conducted after Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM identified some areas for improvement in joint operations. One area that surfaced quickly during the war was the joint targeting process. This was not unexpected in hindsight as there was no established joint doctrine or related systematic training architecture to teach Service personnel how to fuse their skills into a cohesive staff on such short notice. Hard work and long hours eventually worked through the problems but certainly at a price.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) J2 and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) formed a Joint Uniformed Lessons Learned (JULLs) action team to study and recommend solutions for joint targeting. They reported that the problem with joint targeting resulted in part from the assignment of Service personnel to the targeting cells who possessed differing levels of training and experience in the targeting process. In an effort to fix the targeting problem, members of the intelligence training community identified the necessary skills for joint targeting. They also developed a fuller understanding of the problems and requirements in the assignment of personnel for joint force missions.

DIA recognized that the JULLs initiative could serve as a basis for reviewing much larger issues. These issues included—

☐ What is the big picture for training Services' personnel for joint force assignments?

☐ What are the necessary cognitive skills?

☐ How should they acquire and employ these skills?

The General Joint Intelligence Training Committee (GITC), comprised of senior personnel from all the Services, unified commands, and other general intelligence community members, had asked these questions previously. After the Gulf War, the concept of a joint training architecture took on new meaning and increased tempo. The regular meetings of the GITC addressed the architecture and supported ongoing work to develop other courses for joint duty assignments. The effort to develop the architecture was now well under way.

GITC—Vehicle of Change

Under the auspices of DIA, the GITC undertook a review of the training requirements for joint assignments. In identifying how the Services do business in support of joint operations, it became clear that support of joint warfighters required a uniform level of knowledge and experience that most military personnel do not acquire during their normal career assignments.

The problem of a uniform joint targeting process evolved into a requirement to develop several courses of instruction to prepare Service personnel for work in a joint headquarters of a unified command or a separately established joint task force. While that may seem simple, the effort required months of meetings by the Services and the intelligence community. Along with representatives from the unified commands, they developed a plan of action that answered the basic

questions of joint intelligence training:

☐ How do the Services train personnel for joint duty.

☐ What are the critical skills and tasks necessary for a joint assignment.

In moving toward a training solution, it became clear that a systematic approach to resolution of several interrelated problems was emerging. The GITC recognized that it was unreasonable to expect the Services to assume total responsibility for preparing military personnel for joint assignments. The Services might be willing, however, to pool assets and develop joint intelligence courses to be taught in joint environments. Thus, the concept of a Joint General Intelligence Training Architecture was born. The next step was the development and application of the architecture.

Centers for Joint Intelligence Training

In June 1994, GITC contracted a study of joint training requirements. The study provided the outline and direction for the Services' joint training requirements and built a relational database. The database included information on current Service instruction and curricula that supported personnel assignment to joint service positions.

The study also documented the need to continue the joint courses of instruction under development to train personnel for joint duty billets. These courses include the Joint Task Force Management Course, the Joint Targeting Training Course, the Joint Intelligence Course, and the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System course. Also included in the study were courses offered by the Joint Military Intelligence College such as the Collection Management and the Indications and Warning Courses.

The authors of the study also identified the need for unified command intelligence training to meet area-unique missions and responsibilities. Accordingly, the GITC approved the Regional Joint Intelligence Training Facility (RJITF) concept. Under the concept, selected unified commands would develop a training facility to conduct joint and command-specific intelligence training. Currently, the U.S. Pacific and Strategic Commands have established RJITFs. The U.S. European, Atlantic, Central, and Special Operations Commands are in various stages of RJITF development.

The Army Role in Joint Intelligence

The Army vision for intelligence in the 21st century, Intel XXI, includes the concept of providing warfighters a *"dynamic, common understanding of the battlefield, enabling them to train, plan, rehearse, and execute missions."* From the foxhole to the warfighting commander in chief, commanders will be able to conduct their respective tasks with a shared situational awareness throughout the range of military operations to include joint missions.

The Army doctrine for analyzing the battlefield is found in **FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)**. As described in **FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations**, IPB is a *"systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area."* IPB is one of the Army's cornerstone contributions to joint intelligence doctrine. **Joint Pub 2-0, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations**, has accepted IPB as a common intelligence technique because it is a flexible process that can adapt to a broad variety of situations. The IPB process and systems training methodology serves as the framework for the Joint Targeting Course. Scheduled to begin in October 1995, the Joint Targeting Course has great potential and will serve as a model for future joint intelligence courses. The success of the Joint Targeting Course may very well have long term impact on the emerging Joint General Intelligence Training Architecture.

Conclusion

The emerging training architecture and the respective Army role will require the incorporation of new techniques, equipment, and methodologies as the Army moves towards Force XXI. The Army and its sister Services, along with the Joint Staff, DIA, the unified commands, and the other national intelligence agencies must resolve a host of issues to foster better working relationships within the intelligence community. The following are some issues presently under examination that will improve intelligence support:

☐ Develop joint intelligence training priorities.

☐ Resolve resourcing within the intelligence community.

☐ Develop a cost-effective training medium and vehicles for delivery of training.

☐ Provide cross-Service training on Service-specific systems.

☐ Define joint terminology to support Service intelligence training curricula.

The Joint General Intelligence Training Architecture will foster many changes on the Army of today and tomorrow. Army intelligence will evolve to meet the mission requirements of the joint commander. After all, the Military Intelligence Corps' motto is "Always Out Front!"

Edward A. Giarusso is currently an intelligence specialist in the Training Division, Plans and Operations Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Army Staff, the Pentagon. His previous assignments include: international military training specialist in the Pentagon; education specialist at the Army Engineer School, the Intelligence School-Devens and the Army Education Center, Fort Devens; and an Army Internship at the Intelligence School-Devens. Mister Giarusso earned a Bachelor of Arts in history from Roger Williams College and a Master of Science in instructional media systems from the University of Bridgeport.

Naval Intelligence Training: Some Thoughts on the Future

by Captain Frank P. Notz, USN (Retired)

During the past decade we have created a modern, high-technology military with the ability to envision, establish and convert programs (force multipliers) into battlefield successes. One of the force multipliers we have worked hard to achieve is superior training. This commitment to training has been truly evident in our recent conflicts, including the winning of the Cold War. Old warriors know, however, that any future endeavors will demand the same results. The edge we have created in training is a continuing responsibility, something we must protect from being hollowed out. While it is possible for "pop-up" technological surprises to happen, "pop-up" training surprises are the result of a breakdown in the system. So the challenge in the future will be to keep providing our people high levels of competence and confidence (to excel) while simultaneously ensuring we are getting the highest return on our shrinking investment in training.

As the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps continue on the present drawdown road to meet the budgetary realities of the future, the onus on the training establishment will be to become more effective and efficient with fewer resources. Training organizations must continue to provide superior battle-winning training in a more complex, but less resource-rich, environment. While this will take some imagination and resource realignments, the exploding world of communications and information exchange methods will allow this transition to take place. Here in Dam Neck, Virginia, at the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center (NMITC), we are preparing for the information age.

Future Training Support

During the next several years, the training environment will change at NMITC. We will be taking advantage of several technological innovations in information management to transition toward modernized training methods. We will still offer initial skill-level training at the schoolhouse. Using the new information technology, NMITC will also provide specialized and advanced training at the intelligence work center or unit training center, afloat or ashore. Accordingly, we are laying the groundwork for NMITC to become an organization comprised of a schoolhouse that provides—

☐ Classroom instruction for basic skill-level training.

☐ Some specialized training.

☐ Several television studios to "beam out" intermediate and advanced training to fleet and joint intelligence organizations.

What should the NMITC of the future look like? One can envision an in-residence facility equipped to teach initial skills, advanced abilities, and specialized systems training, coupled with high technology facilities to transmit intelligence training to the consumers. More specifically, the facility will revolve around the following three concepts.

Basic Skills Training

NMITC will always be a basic skills training center that instills the methods of our tradecraft into the new Navy and Marine Corps officer and enlisted intelligence specialists of the future. Basic skills training will remain a Service requirement. This center will get them started in the intelligence business and ensure they absorb the Navy and Marine Corps intelligence "culture"—support to the operating forces. The NMITC will always have a requirement to teach Navy and Marine Corps operations intelligence to ensure we are supporting the vision of "From the Sea" strategy and the maritime expeditionary environment.

The biggest changes for basic skills training will be—

☐ Keeping up with the changing operational environment.

☐ Inculcating an awareness of joint intelligence precepts.

☐ Providing more systems training as the Services continue to transition to advanced technology systems for handling and manipulating intelligence data.

Because of the unique demands of the maritime environment, we will continue to instruct our Service intelligence officers and enlisted personnel in basic skills to meet the basic requirements of the fleet and fleet marine forces.

Specialized System Training

The NMITC facility will also include several advanced technology systems labs. They will teach officers and "C" school students the use of specialized intelligence data-handling systems. This training will be system-specific to support the technological weapons of the future.

Editor's Note: "C" schools are similar to follow-on courses like the Electronic Warfare Operators Course at Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

Intermediate and Advanced Skills Training

The real revolution will come in how we conduct intermediate level and advanced skill training. This revolution will occur by employing the intelligence video teletraining (VTT) capabilities we hope to establish. The VTT facilities will develop and transmit intelligence courses to the fleets and joint arena via the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System or Defense Message System communications VTT systems. At NMITC, we are just entering the world of teletraining.

Editor's Note: "The Information Age and the Coming Training Revolution" by Brigadier General Charles W. Thomas in the July-September 1995 issue of the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin discusses the Intelligence Center's "distance learning" and "school without walls" concepts.

Conceptually, this kind of interactive training lends itself well to the many non-technical training courses we presently offer. Eventually, we will be able to sit in a studio and instruct students on certain aspects of functional intelligence or instruct them on a system, whether it be the Navy Tactical Command System-Afloat, Tactical Aircraft Mission Planning


Eventually, NMITC will use VTT facilities to send classroom instruction to the fleets.

System, the EMERALD counternarcotics database, or the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System.

We are looking at supporting this effort with an interactive gaming and training facility. That will allow certain facilities here at NMITC and at other training commands or facilities, units or elements to hook-up to live training practical exercises. The age of interactive video will eventually allow us to interact with intelligence schoolhouses of the other Services. We could take advantage of their expertise in teaching their basic intelligence (joint to us) principles to our personnel. We will also have a supporting interactive library research system. We can use the system to train future intelligence professionals about all the data resources available to them, not just the classified ones.

Joint Operations Training

Another aspect of the future training environment will be the continuing incorporation of joint intelligence training into our training routine at the NMITC. Our people will have to be smart about the operational environment and requirements of the Navy and Marine Corps. They will also need to have a basic understanding of the warfare requirements of the other Services and

how these come together in the joint environment. We must instruct our people in the concepts of how "jointness" comes into play and the systems the other Services are using to manage and manipulate data. Someday, these systems might have enough commonality to enable training on common hardware and software applications. Meanwhile, we are entering this joint field by establishing specific joint training courses for operational intelligence systems, and joint task force intelligence management. The current NMITC mid-career course is also moving toward the joint environment. We continue to call on the national and joint leadership to lecture at this course and are slowly expanding the participation of the other Services.

Reserve Unit Training

One can readily see the applications the above training will have on our intelligence forces. We envision being able to teletrain entire reserve units from a common studio at the NMITC. Besides saving training resources, this will allow us to keep the reserve intelligence force current on many operational and training issues. This is particularly important for joint items which the reserves are routinely taking on in support of the active Services.

Conclusion

Where will all this take us down the long road? We plan to eventually have a training system where the customer could tune in to training sessions taught in a schoolhouse and transmitted via a VTT signal. Intelligence center managers could assess their organizational strengths and weaknesses. Using that assessment, they could, for the first time, be able to develop a time-shared training plan to reinforce or correct any deficiencies. We could use some of this same technology to teach our in-residence basic courses.

In summary, these are exciting times in the training world. We need to integrate conventional training wisdom and practices, still the solid foundation for professionalism, with some of the new and exciting training techniques. At the NMITC, I think we have devised a pathway into the future that incorporates these advances while ensuring we remain committed to our basic training requirements for future Navy and Marine Corps intelligence professionals.

Prior to his retirement in August 1995, Captain Notz served three years as Commander, NMITC. He is a 1995 recipient of the National Military Intelligence Association Rufus L. Taylor Award for Naval Intelligence Professional Excellence. Captain Notz graduated from the University of Scranton in Pennsylvania. He has held numerous staff and command positions in intelligence elements ashore and afloat, including Deputy Director for Intelligence at U.S. European Command.

Marine Corps Intelligence:
Officer Training in the Future

by Major David A. Rababy, USMC

A recent Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps message (ALMAR 100/95) stated, *"The senior leadership of the United States Marine Corps has made a dedicated commitment to significantly enhance the Marine Corps intelligence capability."* Analysis after Operation DESERT STORM, conducted both internally and externally from the Marine Corps, identified six fundamental intelligence deficiencies:

☐ Inadequate doctrinal foundation.

☐ No defined career progression for intelligence officers.

☐ Insufficient tactical intelligence support.

☐ Insufficient joint manning.

☐ Inadequate imagery capability.

☐ Insufficient language capability.

The Marine Corps is undergoing a major restructuring of its intelligence community. The former Director of Marine Corps Intelligence (DIRINT), Major General Van Riper, developed a plan to fix intelligence. Currently under implementation, this plan requires a paradigm shift from generalized intelligence to specific intelligence. In the past, a Marine intelligence officer earned the military occupational specialty (MOS) 0202 by completing 14 weeks of basic intelligence training at the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center (NMITC), in Dam Neck, Virginia. The NMITC course was the beginning and the end of professional training for the intelligence officer (IO). There was no follow-on training as an officer's career progressed.

Mission and Principles

The mission of Marine Corps intelligence is to provide commanders, at every level, with tailored, timely, minimum essential intelligence, and ensure that this intelligence is integrated into the operational planning process. The

following are the seven principles needed for mission completion:

- ☐ The focus must be on tactical intelligence.
- ☐ The intelligence emphasis must be downward.
- ☐ Intelligence drives operations.
- ☐ An experienced, knowledgeable and multidisciplined IO must direct and manage intelligence.
- ☐ Products must be timely and tailored to the user.
- ☐ Intelligence staffs use intelligence produced by intelligence organizations.
- ☐ The last step in the intelligence cycle must be usage, not dissemination.

MOS Reorganization

Based on the DIRINT's direction on the mission and principles, the Marine Corps reorganized the occupational field. The entry-level IO will now enter the Marine Corps as one of the MOSs described in Figure 1.

Core Intelligence Package

The reorganization of the Marine intelligence field has had a major impact upon intelligence training. Since the U.S. Army and U.S. Navy are now training entry-level Marine Corps intelligence officers, the Marine Corps Intelligence Training Directorate at NMITC has developed a comprehensive read-ahead core intelligence package. Initially developed for reserve officers as a supplemental self-paced text, through expansion it also augments basic intelligence officer training at the entry-level schools. The core package consists of four parts:

- ☐ The Marine Corps Institute (MCI) "Introduction to Combat Intelligence" (MCI 02, 8b).
- ☐ NMITC handouts on Marine Corps-unique intelligence subjects complete with quizzes.
- ☐ Military symbology and mapping.

Marines train on the basic skills used in developing IPB templates and overlays.

- ☐ Several reference documents to help the new IOs establish their intelligence libraries.

Officer Advanced Course

In addition to the core package, the Marine Corps developed the officer advanced course. February 1996 is the scheduled start for the pilot advanced course. The major blocks of instruction are—

Noncommon Tasks Training. This training spans all intelligence disciplines. During the noncommon training block, cross training of all basic officer skills will be conducted to ensure that all students are at the same level of knowledge. This will include updates on all Marine Corps and joint intelligence structure; ongoing Headquarters, Marine Corps initiatives; enhanced intelligence writing techniques; and an introduction to tactical decision wargaming.

Planning and Directing. The planning and directing block focuses on deliberate and rapid response planning cycles, staff interaction and responsibilities, coordination of intelligence activities, and operations at all levels of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force. It will also include more wargaming and tactical decision-making.

Collection. The full continuum of collection assets, capabilities and limitations will be the focus of the collections block. It will include managing collection assets, collection planning techniques, tactical reconnaissance and surveillance, and the integration of both tactical and theater assets in support of operations other than war (OOTW).

Processing, Analysis and Production. The development of models, matrices and templates will be the emphasis of the processing, analysis and production block. Students will use advanced intelligence preparation of the battlefield methods. The focus will be on the thirteen missions of OOTW coupled with U.S. Navy Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) doctrine. With the assistance of national agencies, this block will incorporate detailed analysis products and methods.

Dissemination. An entire block of training dedicated to dissemination identifies the Marine Corps emphasis upon dissemination. The block stresses dissemination planning, means and techniques with emphasis placed upon future systems and support.

Targeting. The targeting block will cover both organic and non-organic agencies using techniques to develop and analyze targets. Target management, battle damage assessment, and data sourcing will all be elements within this block.

National Agencies Field Trips. Students make these week-long trips to visit the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and the National Ground Intelligence Center in Charlottesville, Virginia. They also visit the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Marine Corps Intelligence Agency. They are able to tour each facility including the watch centers.

Intelligence Systems Architecture. During the intelligence architecture block of instruction, there will be detailed discussion of all organic, theater and national agencies highlighting connectivity to the agencies. A systems planning and management section will focus on present and future capabilities and limitations.

General Intelligence Procedures. The day-to-day operation of an intelligence section will be the focus of the general intelligence procedures block. This block will have a heavy emphasis on unit intelligence training cou-

pled with logistics, security and special security office functions.

Scenarios. Practical applications and tactical decision gaming (TDG) will reinforce all training. OOTW and OMFTS will be the focus of the wargaming and TDGs. Shaping the battlefield through situational development and tailored support to the commander will all result in enhanced intelligence decisionmaking skills for the students.

Professional development. During this block of instruction, the DIRINT and his deputy address student officers on current operations and future trends. Students can then ask questions.

Conclusion

The Marines at NMITC have been working hard to develop, enhance, and refine intelligence training. The changes the DIRINT is implementing will affect the quality of Marine Corps intelligence well into the 21st century. The changes implemented throughout Marine Corps intelli-

gence are just the beginning; changes in Marine Corps entry-, intermediate- and advanced-level schools are necessary. We need to address and put to rest the myths and misconceptions about intelligence capabilities and limitations. With improved training in both the intelligence and operational schools, an enhanced S2 and S3 relationship is inevitable. Timely, accurate intelligence to the commanders will give them the tools necessary to make their decisions.

Major Rababy is the head of the General Military Intelligence Department, Marine Corps Detachment, NMITC. He is a veteran of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM where he was the Marine Forces intelligence liaison officer to the Saudi Arabian Army Eastern Forces Area Command. In Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, Major Rababy served as the intelligence officer for the Marine Ground Combat Element. He earned a Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of Michigan. You can contact Major Rababy at DSN 433-8321/8325, commercial (804) 433-8321/8325, or on E-mail rababyd@mqg-smtp3.usmc. mil.

□ **0203 - Ground Intelligence Officer.** Following ten weeks of infantry officer training, the future ground intelligence officers attend the U.S. Army's 19-week Military Intelligence Officer Basic Course at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Upon completion, they receive assignments to an infantry battalion, regiment, or division.

□ **0204 - Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Officer.** The HUMINT IO reports to NMITC for 18 weeks of counterintelligence and interrogation training. The second lieutenant HUMINT officers subsequently join one of the newly established HUMINT companies located at each Marine Expeditionary Force.

□ **0206 - Signals Intelligence/Electronic Warfare Officer (SIGINT/EW).** SIGINT/EW officers attend the 18-week Basic Communications Officer Course at Quantico, Virginia, followed by the 15-week Cryptologic Division Officer Course in the Naval Technical Training Center at Corry Station, Pensacola, Florida. The first assignment for second lieutenant ground SIGINT/EW officers is to a radio battalion.

□ **0207 - Aviation Intelligence Officer.** Aviation intelligence officers attend the 19-week Navy Intelligence Officer Basic Course at NMITC. Upon graduation, the second lieutenant aviation officers serve as collection and dissemination officers at a Marine Aircraft Wing.

□ **0202 - Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Intelligence Officer.** Regular Marine Corps officers, upon selection for promotion to captain, enter the MAGTF IO Course. After completion of the course, their designation becomes MAGTF IO. New 0202s report to NMITC for 16 weeks of career intelligence training. Captains graduating from the course can expect a tour in any of the four Marine Corps intelligence disciplines (air, ground, HUMINT or SIGINT/EW) throughout the remainder of their careers.

□ **Tactical Intelligence Warrant Officer.** With the total restructuring of the intelligence officer occupational field, all tactical intelligence warrant officer billets converted to unrestricted officer or senior noncommissioned officer billets.

Figure 1. Marine Corps Intelligence Officer MOSs.

Air Force Intelligence Training: Vector to the 21st Century

by Senior Master Sergeant
Alan R. Dowling, USAF

U.S. Air Force Intelligence has always been geared to the needs of the warrior. Traditionally, Air Force general military intelligence (GMI) has focused on tactical and strategic intelligence requirements of the combat Air Force. These requirements included target identification, mission planning, air crew support, and battle damage assessment. Cryptologic intelligence has focused primarily on the needs of national consumers and has held a more strategic view.

Air Force intelligence requirements have evolved into less of a stovepipe structure since Operation DESERT STORM. They now integrate GMI and cryptologic intelligence to effectively satisfy both tactical and strategic intelligence requirements. As with all military operations, effective training is critical to the success of this structure.

Training is a key area in the Air Force Intelligence Strategic Plan. The plan's goal is to produce intelligence experts thoroughly versed in Air Force operations and to institutionalize flexible, responsive training processes. This training goal directly supports the Strategic Plan's value on people, stressing people as the key to team success and emphasizing personal and professional growth. Training is a linchpin in the Air Force Intelligence Vision of delivering unsurpassed intelligence and achieving operational supremacy through information dominance.

Cradle to Grave Training

The Air Force considers education and training as a career-long process, involving professional military education (PME) and technical training. Officers and enlisted personnel have several levels of mandatory PME.

Enlisted or officer personnel who enter intelligence can expect a robust initial training period. The goal of Air Force intelligence training is to produce a mission-ready intelligence professional skilled in aerospace and information warfare concepts and able to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence from all sources to effectively support or conduct operations at the component and joint level. Officers attend more than 31 weeks of technical training. Following basic training, enlisted personnel attend Air Force specialty code (AFSC) technical training for 13 to 90 weeks, depending on the course.

The Air Education and Training Command's 17th Training Group (TRG) at Goodfellow Air Force Base (AFB), Texas, conducts the majority of Air Force intelligence training. Goodfellow AFB is a former World War II bomber training base in San Angelo, Texas. The 1000-acre base boasts excellent training facilities, recently constructed, quality billeting and base housing, as well as a recreation area at one of the nearby lakes. The 17th TRG graduates approximately 6,500 enlisted personnel and 350 officers every year from all the Services.

Although the 17th TRG provides most of the Air Force's intelligence training, some AFSC training occurs at the other Services' bases, including the Presidio in Monterey, California; the U.S. Army Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca, Arizona; and the Naval Technical Training Center (NTTC) at Corry Station in Pensacola, Florida.

Enlisted Career Path

Enlisted personnel have a specified career path that includes four levels of technical skill: apprentice, journeyman, craftsman, and superintendent, followed by chief enlisted manager. They achieve these skill levels through a combination of technical training and experience.

Apprentice (Skill Level 1-4). Once individuals graduate from basic training, they receive their intelligence AFSC and, upon arrival at their first assignment location, enter a period of qualification training. This on-the-job (OJT) training familiarizes personnel with the local mission and lets them apply the skills and knowledge learned during formal training. This mission qualification period can be quite extensive; for example, by the time enlisted cryptologic linguists qualify to work the mission without supervision, they have typically been in the Air Force nearly three years.

Skill levels beyond apprentice represent both experience in the job and further training.

Journeyman (Skill Level 5). After three months of this apprenticeship period, airmen's supervisors may enroll them in upgrade training for the next skill level. This consists of specific OJT requirements and often a correspondence course. The airman can expect upgrade training for 12 months. To receive skill level 5, apprentices must attain senior airman rank (E-4) which takes about 36 months.

Craftsman (Skill Level 7). Air Force policy requires a mandatory, in-residence course for skill level 7. For this skill level, an individual can expect upgrade training for 18 months. Furthermore, individuals must be staff sergeants (E-5) to reach skill level 7. The average promotion time for this rank is 7.5 years.

Superintendent (Skill Level 9). An individual upgrades to skill level 9 upon promotion to senior master sergeant (E-8) and completion of the Senior Noncommissioned Officer Academy.

Chief Enlisted Manager. The training path peaks at the Chief Enlisted Manager level when an individual attains the rank of chief master sergeant (E-9).

Career Field Education and Training

All AFSCs must have a Career Field Education and Training Plan (CFETP). The Air Force Career Field Manager (AFCFM) formulates the CFETP for that AFSC, along with representatives from major commands and joint activities. This document is in all enlisted training records, allowing all personnel in an AFSC to have a clear view of their career field's requirements and opportunities. Each career field CFETP contains career progression information, all the mandatory and suggested training related to that AFSC. The plan also includes the specialty training standards that stipulate the mandatory tasks and knowledge requirements for each skill level. Air Force policy encourages officer CFETPs and one is under development for the intelligence officer career field.

The Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence's AFCFMs establish policy for intelligence career fields and are responsible for monitoring how units use personnel in the AFSCs and ensure training. They must also accurately classify career field requirements. AFCFMs monitor use through close coordination with the commands and joint activities that use the intelligence career personnel.

Training Requirements

Intelligence training has always been user-defined. Through Air Force or Department of Defense (DOD) forums, major commands or other DOD operational users state the need for the specific skills and knowledge required of each Air Force intelligence specialty. These requirements are the basis for AFSC training. The pace of technology, force drawdowns, and greatly broadened Air Force missions, both traditional and non-traditional, are causing rapid changes in operations. The scope and pace of these changes highlight the need to forecast potential training needs early in order to prepare training for these new missions and requirements.

Lieutenant General Kenneth A. Minihan, the Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, has established an Intelligence Training Advisory Board (ITAB) to study and discuss changing defense intelligence activities, project training requirements to support those activities, and craft new, more effective training approaches. The ITAB consists of a core cadre, core functional staff, and subject matter experts. The core cadre ensures consistency in methodology and provides input as necessary. The core functional staff helps provide the ITAB with a non-intelligence perspective on issues. The transitory functional staff membership var-

An imagery interpreter student learns the basics of light table operation.

ies, composed of individuals with expertise in the issue before the ITAB. The ITAB better prepares the training community for future intelligence missions and requirements by ensuring training reflects operational reality.

The Air Force has streamlined the process for validating training requirements in order to speed training development. Under this streamlined process, the Education and Training Division (ETD) in the Air Intelligence Agency (AIA) is the focal point for training requirements identification. (See Figure 1.) ETD is the conduit for feedback between AIA field units, major commands, the 17th TRG, and the AIA liaison officers with the Intelligence Air Staff (intelligence counterpart officers). The ETD evaluates feedback, validates changed or new requirements with the major commands, joint activities, other Services, and DOD agency users, and provides those training requirements to the 17th TRG. Similarly, the ITAB forwards potential training requirements that they have identified to ETD for validation. The training requirements associated with information warfare will be the topic for the first ITAB.

Figure 1. Intelligence Requirements Identification.

Information Warfare Training

Information warfare is an outgrowth of telecommunications technology. Industrialized nations have easy access to information through computers, modems, telecommunications nodes, satellites, and so forth. The Air Force views information warfare as another realm of warfare. Within the information warfare environment are additional warfare options against traditional air targets and corresponding vulnerabilities.

General Ronald R. Fogleman, Air Force Chief of Staff, considers information warfare so important to warfighting that an Air Force team recently briefed every commander in chief of the U.S. unified commands on Air Force efforts to incorporate information warfare into doctrine and integrate it into force deployment. Some level of information warfare training will be included in all Air Force AFSC training. Several AFSCs, including intelligence, will likely deal heavily in an information warfare environment; these career fields will tailor training to meet their specific information warfare needs.

Changing Structure and Mission

Information warfare is not the only challenge for intelligence

training. The Air Force has undergone unprecedented change in the last few years. There has been a top-down restructuring of the Air Force to meet the needs of a post-Cold War world and force drawdowns. Furthermore, policy changes made technical and upgrade training more thorough and meaningful. The force restructure and training policy changes have combined with new technology to create new opportunities for intelligence training.

Like the other Services, Air Force manpower has been shrinking at the same time the multi-polar world has caused missions to drastically expand. Additionally, due to high operational tempo, new intelligence graduates must apply their training earlier than their predecessors in an environment where missions constantly evolve. These factors directly impact intelligence training. In the past, the Air Force updated training requirements on a three-to five-year cycle, unless field input or usage changes dictated the need for an out-of-cycle review. Course design and implementation took up to eighteen months. In the post-Cold War world, mission requirements change rapidly; the training paradigm for a bipolar world is less effective in today's multi-polar global situation.

To meet these rapidly evolving requirements, the 17th TRG com-

mander, Colonel Donald Freeman, challenged his training staff to improve curriculum development and delivery. They responded with ideas that are driving changes to traditional Air Education and Training Command course design. These include essay tests for some courses and an expanded, weeklong, simulated exercise scenario designed to provide officer and enlisted students a realistic introduction to intelligence operations by combining elements of both GMI and cryptologic intelligence training.

The 17th TRG is addressing what is euphemistically called the "data dump syndrome" in order to overcome the memorize-test-forget method of learning of some its courses. The Voice Processing Training System (VPTS), a computer-based system designed for cryptologic linguist training, is a continuing success. In the VPTS training, students receive knowledge training on a subject, then they are immediately given opportunities to apply that knowledge in performance exercises. This process strongly reinforces the knowledge training.

Goodfellow AFB is also reengineering intelligence officer training, dramatically changing the way instructors present information to the students. Historically, instructors gave officer students huge amounts of information in the traditional lecture method and tested their retention using multiple choice tests. The new training direction in shifts the responsibility for learning to the individual student, using a classroom design that closely emulates a standard field unit. The day's learning activities center around a typical work day at the unit. Students, under an instructor's supervision, research and present briefings on topics formerly taught by instructor lectures. Students then use the information from these briefings in a series of daily operational activities patterned after normal unit functions. Verification of learning no longer relies on

multiple choice tests; instructors ask students to provide short answers to questions or write essay responses to ensure they have mastered the material. So far these innovations have only been in officer training. The 17th TRG at Goodfellow AFB will evaluate the results and plans to implement similar changes in enlisted training courses.

Exportable Training

Technology is driving another training innovation: new methods of exportable training. Also termed "distance learning" and "job-site training," exportable training courses can be on computer disk or in multimedia forums (compact disk-read only memory, secure video teleconferencing, etc.). If trainers can effectively teach a course via exportable means, the training becomes less expensive and more accessible. An obvious advantage is the cost savings: units need not pay costs associated with temporary duty assignments to training. An additional advantage is the potential for exportable training to reach a much larger audience, as training schedules can adjust around mission constraints. The Air Force offers several such intelligence courses. For example, the new Joint Imagery Analysis Course, an exportable version of the Defense Sensor Interpretation and Applications Training Program (DSIATP), will be available in the fall of 1995.

Consolidated Training

The Air Force has a long-standing commitment to seek efficiencies and reduce redundancy through consolidated training. The training may be consolidated (teaching identical Services' training requirements) or colocated (teaching at the same school using differing Service standards as training requirements). In the past several years, there has been a significant trend for all Service personnel to receive training on tasks and knowledge requirements common to all Services.

This training is truly joint in that an Air Force student may receive skill training formerly taught only to U.S. Navy and Marine Corps counterparts who, in many cases, are now learning what were once Air Force-only skills. Such graduates are well prepared to function in a joint operational intelligence environment.

Joint Training

The U.S. experience in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM emphasized the importance of joint warfare. Just as we should train the way we fight, the Air Force remains committed to joint training. DOD appoints a Service as responsible training authority for specific intelligence systems or as executive agent for intelligence disciplines. The Air Force is the executive agent for advanced imagery training. The DSIATP course is the only Air Force GMI executive agent training currently available to all Service personnel. However, the Air Force plays a larger role in multi-Service intelligence training as a part of the Cryptologic Training System (CTS).

Within the CTS, the Air Force is the executive agent for cryptologic linguist and analysis and reporting training; both disciplines

are at Goodfellow AFB. (See Figure 2.) At Goodfellow AFB, soldiers, sailors, and marines are in a unique situation; outside the training compound, personnel are responsible to their respective Service units. However, when their work involves cryptologic training (i.e., as instructors or curriculum developers) they report through the appropriate training squadron to the 17th TRG commander. Under the CTS, the Air Force plays a part in the other Services' intelligence training facilities as well, with training squadrons at Fort Huachuca for Morse code training, and NTTC Corry Station for signals analysis training. These training squadrons have the same dual reporting situation at those locations as Army, Navy, and Marine Corps personnel do at Goodfellow AFB.

An excellent example of joint cryptologic intelligence training is the Consolidated Intermediate Analysis and Reporting Course (CIARC). Multi-Service working groups crafted the training requirements for this course; the course uses advanced hardware and software. CIARC came on line in April 1995. It is also unique in that the Air Force agreed to let the Army teach CIARC in conjunction with its Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course at the


Figure 2. Air Force Enlisted Cryptologic Training.

Military Intelligence Noncommissioned Officers Academy at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. The Air Force made this decision to aid the Army with its concept of dual PME and technical training. However, as executive agent, the Air Force retains responsibility for course content and will ensure training meets Air Force and course training standards.

U.S. Air Force intelligence is focusing on the future, which holds challenges and opportunities. In addition to information warfare and responsive training development to meet rapidly changing mission needs, the Air Force Career Field Managers are working with operations and training personnel to ensure mission requirements and training delivery keep pace with each other. Air Force intelligence training continues to meet today's requirements while preparing for the needs of the intelligence professional of the 21st century.

Senior Master Sergeant Dowling is Chief, Cryptologic Intelligence Force Management and Foreign Language Programs for the Force Management and Training Team, Directorate of Plans, Policy, and Evaluation, Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. He has performed a variety of duties in the cryptographic linguist career field, most recently as cryptologic linguist superintendent and flight commander. You can reach him at DSN 761-4784 or commercial (703) 681-4784.

Assignment Goodfellow

by Lieutenant Colonel
Michael R. Rogers, USAF

Most of us who have been in the U.S. Air Force's Air Intelligence Agency or any of its predecessors for a while have fond memories of Goodfellow Air Force Base (AFB), Texas, home of cryptologic training. I know my memories of Goodfellow from 18 years ago, when I went through signals intelligence (SIGINT) officer school there, were of a sleepy little Air Force base on the outskirts of the friendly little town of San Angelo. San Angelo is still a friendly little town, but that is about the *only* thing that has remained the same. Goodfellow AFB and its mission have grown and diversified greatly in the last few years, and the resident 17th Training Wing is on the leading edge of technical training innovation in the Air Education and Training Command .

Organization and Mission

The 17th Training Group (TRG) has grown into a diverse technical training organization that trains disciplines far different from the SIGINT-focused school of the past. The 17th TRG consists of four squadrons and three geographically separated units. Figure 1 on the following page outlines the basic organization of the 17th TRG and the missions of its subordinate units.

The Base Realignment and Closure process has contributed to the growth of the training mission at Goodfellow AFB. The following highlights some of training missions transferred to the 17th TRG:

☐ General military intelligence (GMI) training from Lowry AFB, Colorado, in 1992.

☐ Imagery and electronic intelligence training from Keesler AFB, Mississippi, in 1994.

☐ Joint service fire training from Chanute AFB, Illinois, in 1993.

If you have not been to Goodfellow AFB in a while, the new fire school, part of the 312th Training Squadron (TRS) is a sight to behold. The school has a new 213,867 square foot facility and a huge vehicle fleet of firefighting trucks and large, modern fire training pits. The projected student load for fire training alone for 1996 is 3004, over three times past.

the student load for cryptolinguists.

Intelligence Training

Yes, Goodfellow AFB has retained its original cryptolinguists, analysis and reporting, cryptologic maintenance, and SIGINT officer training functions. These are now spread out over the 312th, 315th, and 316th TRSs. The 311th, 313d, and 314th TRSs exercise administrative control over Air Force students going through the schools for which other Services are the executive agencies.

312th Training Squadron. The 312th TRS provides analysis and reporting (A&R) training for all Services. This training is undergoing a major revision. It still culminates in an exercise that replicates a Surveillance and

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Headquarters, Air Education and Training Command
Randolph AFB, TX

2d Air Force
Keesler AFB, MS

17th Training Wing
Goodfellow AFB, TX

17th Training Group
Goodfellow AFB, TX

Goodfellow Squadrons

312 TRS	315 TRS	316 TRS	17 TRSS
Analysis & reporting Crypto-maintenance. Firefighting.	General intelligence. Intelligence operations & applications. ELINT. Combat Targeting.	Crypto-linguist (1N3XX).	Training support.

Geographically Separated Units

311 TRS	313 TRS	314 TRS
Monterey, CA Language training.	Fort Huachuca, AZ Initial morse code training (1N2XX).	Pensacola, FL Non-morse code training (1N2XX).

Figure 1. Organization of the 17th Training Group.

Warning Center. There are, however, many new training initiatives within the A&R training flight. The new Consolidated Intermediate Analysis and Reporting Course (CIARC) came on line 5 April 1995. In addition, all four Services are in the process of revising their entry-level A&R training courses. The U.S. Navy and the Marine Corps expect their new course to come on-line by October 1995. The U.S. Army and the Air Force are in the first stages of course redevelopment. Both courses are also candidates for further reengineering as the 17th TRG attempts to integrate all enlisted and officer intelligence training exercises.

315th Training Squadron. The 315th TRS is implementing a major reengineering of its "alpha" (operations) and "bravo" (applications) officer courses. The new courses will consist of realistic scenarios and performance-based training. The objective will be to produce a more mission-ready graduate who can hit the ground running with minimal training upon arrival at that first duty station.

The "alpha" course will expose the future intelligence operations officers to simulated field site operations that provide more direct interface with enlisted analysts, reporters, and linguist students. To enhance the applications officer training, the squadron is introducing the Combat Intelligence Systems to its arsenal of training systems. This new state-of-the-art workstation supports Air Force mission planning and targeting. It is exactly the type of equipment intelligence applications officers will use in the field.

316th Training Squadron. Cryptologic linguist training for all Services is the job of the 316th TRS. The squadron provides target-specific training in nine languages: Arabic, Chinese, French, Hebrew, Korean, Persian-Farsi, Russian, Spanish, and Vietnamese. It provides a "non-target" course that provides general cryptolinguist training to "low-flow" language students, such as Tagalog and Portugese.

Cryptologic students train on the 468-position Voice Processing Training System (VPTS). Although an old and slow system by today's standards, the VPTS is a success story with over 12,000 hours of active courseware and a 98 percent reliability rate. The VPTS was the Department of Defense's first experience with a large-scale computer-assisted instruction training system. The system's technology is now outdated and in the seventh year of a planned ten-year life expectancy. Studies are ongoing to select a system to replace the VPTS. Emphasis for the new system is for one that provides commonality with fielded operational systems and the latest in interactive, computer-based instructional technology. Additionally, a team is exploring the idea of an end-of-course computer-based simulated exercise that would integrate all of the intelligence disciplines taught at Goodfellow into a single learning experience that closely replicates the entire spectrum of intelligence support to the warfighter.

Jointness—A Way Of Life

"Joint training" is not just a catchy phrase at Goodfellow AFB; it is something we have

been doing for a long time. In fact, the 316th TRS is the Air Force Air Education and Training Command's model for joint training.

In both the 312th and 316th squadrons, joint courses are numerous, and becoming more so every year. For instance, in 1990 there were only three consolidated courses (i.e., as in comprised of more than one Service): Hebrew, Persian-Farsi, and Vietnamese. Late last year, the Air Force and Navy decided to combine their Arabic courses; by late 1995, there will be consolidated Korean and Chinese courses. The trend is for most of the remaining courses, including Russian and Spanish, to eventually consolidate. This will bring our language training more in line with the realities of joint operations in the field and activities such as the Regional SIGINT Operations Centers.

In the joint classroom, instructors from different Services teach students from all the Services. Optimally, these instructors become qualified to teach all phases of an entire course. This exposes students at an early stage to the multi-Service environment they will no doubt encounter in the field.

Another indicator of inter-Service cooperation toward the same goals is the opening of Goodfellow's Consolidated Language Resource Center (LRC). Housed in an older building, Air Force and Army personnel teamed up and completed a self-help project to refurbish the facility. Through their efforts, the LRC is now a place where students can work on sharpening their language skills. Opened in January 1995, the LRC houses various computer-based and conventional language refresher and maintenance programs. It also possesses facilities for Satellite Communications for Language broadcasts and video-teleconferencing. Since January 1995, the LRC has conducted six language refresher classes in the video-teleconferencing room.

Pillar of Intelligence Training:
The 111th MI Brigade

by Second Lieutenant Ethan T. Vessels

Editor's Note: This article was adapted from the 111th MI Brigade Commander's Brief.

As a pillar of professional development, institutional training is critical in the shaping of military intelligence (MI) professionals in the era of force projection and information operations. The 111th MI Brigade (Training), U. S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH), accepts this challenge every day. A leader in Army and joint intelligence training, the 111th MI Brigade is a vital member of the intelligence training community.

Mission

The 111th MI Brigade's mission is to produce trained MI officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers for the total force. The brigade accomplishes its mission through—

☐ Initial entry training (IET) and advanced individual training (AIT) in all MI enlisted career management fields.

☐ Basic, transition, and advanced officer training.

☐ Basic and advanced warrant officer training.

☐ Preassignment training for MI battalion and brigade command sergeants major.

☐ Preassignment training for G2 and G2 staff sergeants major.

☐ Precommand training for MI commanders of MI battalions and brigades.

In addition to its primary mission of MI training, the 111th MI Brigade stands ready to deploy subject matter experts and units equipped with low density systems such as the Hunter unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and TROJAN Special Purpose Integrated Remote Intelligence Terminal (SPIRIT) to contingency operations throughout the world.

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
Soldiers from the 304th MI Battalion maintain an unmanned aerial vehicle system.

Photo by Eli Whitney

Organization

The brigade consists of five MI battalions and two detachments. Four battalions and one detachment are at Fort Huachuca. One detachment is at Melbourne, Florida. The fifth battalion is at Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas, with one of its companies in Pensacola, Florida.

Brigade Headquarters. The Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment's mission is command and control, administrative, and logistics support for the 111th MI Brigade. It consists of all the brigade staff and the Advanced Training Division (ATD). The ATD provides automation support, prototype training, infrastructure planning, and simulations for the entire Intelligence Center.

304th MI Battalion. The 304th MI Battalion provides intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) training, testing, maintenance, and equipment support to the Intelligence Center. In addition to its training mission at Fort Huachuca, the battalion's UAV and TROJAN SPIRIT systems frequently support exercises, demonstrations, and contingency missions worldwide.

The 304th MI Battalion operates Libby Army Air Field where its instructors train all special electronic mission aircraft (SEMA) crews in QUICKFIX and GUARD-RAIL IEW operations. Instructor pilots also train student pilots in the unique flight and survivability characteristics of SEMA aircraft.

The battalion also operates the Department of Defense UAV Test Center. At the UAV Test Center, the 304th MI Battalion trains soldiers and marines in UAV operations and maintenance. Equipped with the Pioneer and Hunter UAVs, the battalion provides significant support to UAV doctrine development and system testing.

305th MI Battalion. The 305th MI Battalion recently moved here from Fort Devens, Massachusetts. Its mission is to provide electronic warfare and signals intelligence (SIGINT) training to soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and officers. The battalion's IET and AIT includes operator and maintenance courses on tactical and strategic IEW systems. A joint training environment, the battalion relies upon its Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force instructors provide morse code and electronic intelligence training.

309th MI Battalion. The 309th MI Battalion provides IET and AIT in all-source intelligence, counterintelligence (CI), human intelligence, and imagery intelligence (IMINT) operations and analysis. Specifically, the battalion produces the Army's all-source intelligence analysts, CI agents and analysts, ground surveillance system operators, imagery analysts, interrogators, and Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) Ground Station Module (GSM) operators.

326th MI Battalion. The 326th MI Battalion is the officer training battalion. The battalion trains MI lieutenants through colonels in basic and advanced MI skills. Additionally, the battalion trains warrant officers and international officers. Their primary goal is to train officers to provide timely intelligence to their commanders.

344th MI Battalion. The 344th MI Battalion provides IET and AIT at Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas. One company is at the Naval Technical Training Center at

Soldiers of the 309th MI Battalion stand ready to begin another day of instruction.

Photo provided by Cpt Andrew L. Hergenrother

Corry Station in Pensacola, Florida. The battalion's mission is to support the Air Force and Navy IMINT and SIGINT training mission. In addition, it provides Army SIGINT analysis, intercept, and maintenance training. The battalion is also responsible for advanced IMINT and Army firefighting training at Goodfellow and photographic technical training at Pensacola.

Joint STARS Detachment. The Development, Training, and Test Detachment for the Joint STARS is in Melbourne, Florida. It is the developmental center for all testing, evaluation, and demonstration of the prototype Joint STARS. The unit also assists in developing training programs, tactics, and techniques for the employment of the Joint STARS. The detachment has a contingency mission to deploy Army aircrews and Joint STARS GSM operators in support of worldwide operations.

Future Training

Just as Fort Huachuca was a home to traditional cavalry in the 19th century, the 111th MI Brigade sees itself as the home of the electronic cavalry in the 21st century. Fort Huachuca is becoming a national ground intelligence training center. The center will be responsible for all aspects of ground intelligence regardless of Service. The brigade's focus will not change, but broaden. It will continue to teach tactical MI skills focused on providing timely intelligence to the commander.

The MI Corps will move into the information age and develop the high-technology soldier required in the 21st century. This will happen in several areas. The first is interactive training. Comparable to a flight simulator, this type of training will allow the soldier to use the same cognitive thought process in the training environment as will be used in combat.

Interactive training relates to automation training. Before MI soldiers can use the information age tools, they must have automation training. These tools are automation systems and software that speed our ability to process and correlate vast amounts of information into quality intelligence. These advanced systems fit into a larger architecture which requires our soldiers to have tech-nological skills. These skills allow greater access to the theater and national intelligence structure.

The ATD's simulation center is another piece that drives our training. The simulation center has the capability to integrate simulations over a network and train a large group with interactive scenarios. Additionally, the extensive communications structure available gives the center the capability to place the simulations at another location—thereby providing distance learning.

Conclusion

As the Army vaults into the information age, the MI Corps will lead in the development, implementation, and integration of technology into the 21st century. Our armed forces demand dynamic and skilled MI soldiers who can master the forthcoming technology. The 111th MI Brigade creates those soldiers.

Second Lieutenant Ethan T. Vessels is currently attending the MI Officer Basic Course at USAIC&FH. He is a 1995 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York.

Center Without Walls: Training in the Information Age

by Lieutenant Colonel
Dennis A. Lowrey

Several urgent requirements came together in the spring of 1995 to produce an innovative program called "Center Without Walls." The Center Without Walls is an on-going effort by the United States Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) to radically redesign, develop, and provide innovative training services to the first Information Age branch, military intelligence (MI). This article explores the requirements, establishes the program azimuth, and gives a progress report for those with only traditional access to information.

Requirement: Training in an Age of Austerity

In the fall of 1994, Brigadier General Claudia J. Kennedy, then Deputy Commanding General, USAIC&FH, began an intensive look at the Intelligence Center organization, existing programs, and methods of operation. The purpose of this self-examination was to ask fundamental questions about how the Intelligence Center organized to fight the training battle. The review determined that the organization is sound but needs to focus on making every minute of institutional training count.

This adjustment to the focus of intelligence training must recognize that change is a constant. Doctrine, materiel, and organizations will continue to evolve to meet the demands of the future. The training process needs to recognize this element of constant change and adapt to it.

Doctrine

Key trends in intelligence doctrine are clear. Under the leadership of then Major General Paul E. Menoher and later Major General John F. Stewart, Jr., the Intelligence Center revised doctrine to reflect the needs of the force projection Army. **FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations,** 27 September 1994, established commander driven intelligence, tactical tailoring, split-based operations, intelligence synchronization, and broadcast dissemination as our MI principles. This doctrinal shift, which also incorporated the lessons learned from Operation DESERT STORM, required a massive education effort not only for MI leaders but for all Army leaders. In the fall of 1994, the new USAIC&FH commander, Brigadier General Charles W. Thomas directed the Center to develop doctrine for Force XXI and explore the requirements of information warfare.

An implication of the principle of tactical tailoring is that we must effectively integrate operational and tactical information networks in a joint and combined environment. Many MI officers who have served at the division and below have never worked with operational intelligence networks, or the Department of Defense (DOD) Intelligence Information System (DODIIS) community.

Joining DODIIS and tactical networks together must become routine if we are to fully tailor the intelligence architecture to meet the need of commanders. Furthermore, MI officers will have to become familiar with these networks and information integration challenges. All Active and Reserve Component MI personnel must become proficient in using the entire system of DOD intelligence.

Materiel

The modernization of MI systems has proceeded at a rapid pace. New, highly capable, sophisticated equipment such as the All-Source Analysis System, Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System, and unmanned aerial vehicle systems are entering the MI force structure. Focused on getting systems to the force, the MI leadership has made tough resource decisions to keep our modernization on track. Modernization is, however, opening up a training gap in the force. Our new equipment, while highly capable, is more complex to operate and requires tight synchronization with the commander's operational plan. Soldiers and leaders need more training, information, and opportunities to practice with the new systems.

Organizations

In table of organization and equipment (TO&E) units, the tempo of operations is increasing. Regular deployments are a fact of life. There is less time to train and units have little time to invest in

their own training support programs. Tactical tailoring means that units will go to war with equipment that is not part of their normal peacetime organization. The field clearly needs more help in coping with doctrine and materiel change.

To maintain its fighting edge, the Army is shrinking table of distribution and allowance Army positions and trimming institutional courses. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) directed subordinate centers to cut functional courses to sustain core soldier and leader training programs without increasing course lengths. Therefore, the USAIC&FH could not use the increased training time to make up for the sophistication of our new equipment. Training support and peripheral programs decreased to protect the instructor force. An innovative approach was essential.

The Intelligence Center needed to identify core competencies in MI, train to standard but maintain the capability of constantly evolving the implementation of our

core competencies. Simultaneously, we had to provide more training support to the field so they could conduct sustainment training while maintaining the tempo of operations. Brigadier General Kennedy codified this new approach into a vision statement that the review team briefed to General Thomas. General Thomas approved the vision and directed us to execute it.

Azimuth: Training for Intel XXI

Figure 1 depicts the new MI training architecture. There are three elements to this architecture, but we will focus on the first goal—push support to the Total Force. This is the essence of the Center Without Walls.

The Center Without Walls is the outreach portion of our new training vision. The idea is to break down traditional and slow communication barriers between the USAIC&FH and the field force. The Intelligence Center is not a separate factory of training packages and manuals. It is a partner

in the total MI team providing ongoing support to all operational units.

The Intelligence Center writers and instructors need to understand our new equipment and doctrine. With this information, they can develop the initial tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to get the new systems to the force. Based on lessons from field experience, writers and instructors can then refine TTP. The Center will not wait for the perfect solution nor expect that there be one.

We need to make the Intelligence Center capable of rapidly reinforcing every MI unit's training program. We can do this by—

☐ Making initial briefings available.

☐ Putting simple and plain courses in first, the fancy things in later.

☐ Writing lesson plans so noncommissioned officers (NCOs) can use them in unit and institutional training.

☐ Breaking down the barrier between institutional and sustainment training.

☐ Spanning the gap between Reserve and Active Component training.

☐ Building training for the Total Force.

Simultaneously, we need to be ready to absorb the lessons of operational experience. The initial TTP is just that. Individual TO&E units quickly develop experience that the Intelligence Center must capture and incorporate into combat developments, doctrine, and training. We have to make it easy for units to communicate with USAIC&FH.

The initial strategy we adopted was to leverage INTERNET, specifically the World Wide Web, to communicate with the force. We focused first on the Web because it was visual, easy to use, and widely accessible. INTERNET would enable users to reach the reserve force structure. Additionally, the software on the Web is

Figure 1. MI Training Architecture.

the same as the software used on the Intelligence Link (INTELINK) and INTELINK-S which are essentially classified closed-domain versions of the Web.

The Center Without Walls is about using modern communications means. We use these means to create a more cohesive total MI team. The total MI team quickly adapts to new technological capabilities while maintaining a warfighting edge. (See Figure 2.)

Progress Report: Efforts to Date

A Tiger Team from the Center's 111th MI Brigade developed the prototype for the Center Without Walls. The brigade formed the team to build the physical, software, and information architecture to support the vision. Colonel Norman Williamson, commander, 111th MI Brigade, charged the members of the Tiger Team to rapidly develop a prototype of an initial Web capability, create software, develop the security measures, and prepare the USAIC&FH to take over portions of this project. The team was not going to build a new, large organization but embed new techniques in the existing instructor, combat development, and garrison forces while developing a small residual support capability.

The Tiger Team was not a collection of computer experts. It consisted of representatives from the MI NCO Academy, the garrison staff, the Deputy Assistant Commandant's office, the Reserve Forces office, and the battalions of the 111th MI Brigade. The officer leadership was provided by Lieutenant Colonel John R. Brooks and the NCO leader was Master Sergeant Stacy Smith. The team came together in a room provided with computers, connections to INTERNET, and a variety of software tools for developing materials for the Web. They were encouraged to explore the Web and then teach themselves to use the tools. The team quickly

Figure 2. Using Technology to Maintain the Warfighting Edge.

came together and posted material on the Web in a matter of two weeks. The team also developed a training package for units in the field.

Establishing the Web Site

A Web site requires physical and software architecture. Establishing a site is a complicated task. It requires—

☐ Connection to the DOD Military Network (MILNET) or INTERNET.

☐ Means for local users to dial in (a terminal server).

☐ Physical means to connect a server, server hardware, and server software.

Initially, the Tiger Team chose to use a SUN SPARC 10 for the prototype version of the Web site. The Fort Huachuca Directorate of Information Management provided the connectivity to the MIL-NET. The server ran Mosaic server software from the National Center for SuperComputing Applications. Mosaic server software was free but it required considerable UNIX operating system and programming expertise to keep running. We learned that we did not have sufficient programming expertise to keep up with changes to the Mosaic software

and that a commercial solution was necessary. The solution to pursue was tied to our assessment of the security measures.

Information Security

The INTERNET and the Web are available worldwide. Once the Intelligence Center server was on-line (even before it was announced) a commercial firm in Europe had touched our site. Security clearly was a first consideration. A Web site is essentially electronic publishing. Working with the visual information activity of the Directorate of Operations, Training, and Doctrine, the Tiger Team developed an initial plan which incorporated the latest developments in the commercial sector.

The brigade Tiger Team determined that the Web site at the Center should electronically publish and make readily available to any user of the Web, command information cleared for general release. Other unclassified support and instructional materials would be made available to authorized users behind appropriate operational security screens. The team was very cautious about what information they provided through the Web.

Figure 3. Huachuca Web Site Information Security Solution.

The overlying architecture consists of the following categories of unclassified information:

☐ Command information cleared for general release.

☐ Instructional information for field use (e.g., lesson plans).

☐ Operational information for field use (e.g., field manuals).

☐ Administrative information for field use.

☐ Instructional information for local use (e.g., schedules).

The last four categories are protected by software security procedures. No classified information is placed on any server connected to the INTERNET.

The security solution the team selected was Netscape commercial security server software running on a Microsoft Windows server. The user software would be Netscape using Trumpet as the dial-up connection. The USAIC&FH purchased Netscape security server software and five hundred client software licenses. The Netscape security server works with remote server access encryption. (The software is marketed as banking level security with sufficiently robust security to handle credit card transactions over the INTERNET.) The team also decided to build a file trans-

fer protocol archive for the information in the restricted information domain which users can only reach through the Netscape security screen. The field will have the appropriate access information when we train them to use the client software. (See Figure 3.)

"Turning On" Huachuca

The Intelligence Center activated its Web site on 15 February 1995. There are more than sixty pages reflecting most of the activities at Fort Huachuca. Welcome letters and materials for the NCO Academy, officer courses, and many of the enlisted courses are on the Web. There is equipment information, garrison information, and a page for the MI Corps Association. New arrivals at Fort Huachuca now have a wealth of information available to them. The secure server should be operable by September 1995 and lesson plans, field manuals, and instructional briefings will become available to the Total Force.

The USAIC&FH will activate its Web site in the following phases:

☐ Phase I (February-May 1995): In the first phase, we established a Web presence with command information, used readily available software, developed expertise with Web

technology, designed the information architecture, established oversight, upgraded the terminal server, and aroused the field's interest.

☐ Phase II (May 95 - September 1995): During this period we hardened the Web site with new hardware and software as required; implemented local procedures for electronic publishing on the Web site; established restricted information domain for unclassified instructional, operational and administrative information; and experimented with student use of the Web site for instructional support. We provided client software and training to the field for use of the restricted information domain.

☐ Phase III (September 1995 and beyond): The Center will sustain security, electronic publishing, and oversight procedures. USAIC&FH will also use the Web site for supporting instruction both locally and in the field.

In the future, the Intelligence Center will explore in-depth simulations, network architectures, security issues of the information age, and management of information. We strongly recommend you get on-line in INTERNET. If you do not have the capability either in your unit or at home, acquire it. You should set yourself the task of establishing your link into the Web and then explore the information available. The Intelligence Center needs your feedback—do not wait for a data call or a tasking. Share your experience with us. Send us your standing operating procedures, after-action reports, and your observations. This is your chance to become a user of the Center Without Walls.

Lieutenant Colonel Dennis A. Lowrey assumed command of the 326th MI Battalion, 111th MI Brigade, at Fort Huachuca, Arizona in June 1995. He is the overall architect for the infrastructure supporting the Center Without Walls. Readers can reach him at DSN 821-5456, commercial (520) 533-5456, or E-mail lowreyd@huachuca-emh1.army.mil.

CONCEPTS & DOCTRINE

Intel XXI—Support to the Force XXI Warfighter

by Major Kyle J. Rogers

Intel XXI is the military intelligence (MI) Corps' vision for how the Intelligence Battlefield Operating System (BOS) will contribute to Force XXI. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is developing details on future division warfighting and the MI community will develop a concept to best support the Force XXI mission. This article addresses MI support to the Force XXI division warfighter.

TRADOC **Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations,** describes the Army's Force XXI vision of technological and informational superiority for the 21st century. This pamphlet and **FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations,** form the basis for Intel XXI. **FM 34-1** lists the five doctrinal principles of intelligence support that will guide the MI transition. The five principles are—

☐ The commander drives intelligence.

☐ Tactical tailoring.

☐ Split-based operations.

☐ Intelligence synchronization.

☐ Broadcast dissemination.

Commander Driven

During Force XXI operations, the commander focuses the intelligence effort. He ensures that MI is responsive to battle command and subordinate information requirements. During all phases of Force XXI operations, the commander—

☐ Identifies, clearly articulates, and prioritizes his intelligence and targeting requirements.

☐ Understands the capabilities and limitations of the Intelligence BOS.

☐ Knows how to leverage and employ the intelligence system to its full potential.

☐ Brokers subordinates' information and resource requirements.

☐ Melds the Intelligence BOS into the total combined arms effort.

Tactical Tailoring

Intel XXI will support Force XXI division operations from predeployment through conflict resolution. The Force XXI division will have a precisely tailored mix of armored, aviation, and light brigades (depending on strategic, operational, or tactical requirements). Tailoring of the MI force supporting the division will also depend on the situation.

The modularity of divisional MI units will permit detaching functions and capabilities from a parent unit and tailoring such functions and capabilities for deployment. Additionally, if the division requires a more robust intelligence collection and processing capability than is available, MI corps and echelon above corps unit resources will deploy. It will be necessary to have an interchangeable, expandable, and tailorable MI force to meet changing missions and needs of a force projection Army.

Split-Based Operations

During the deployment stage, situations will determine the composition of the MI support. This would likely consist of a deployable intelligence support element (DISE), which is normally a slice of the division's analysis and control element (ACE). The DISE deploys with the initial entry commander and can access intelligence databases and systems outside the area of operations (AO). The DISE provides the commander with a link from his forward-deployed force to an intelligence support base in the United States or other locations outside the AO.

Secure and reliable information datalinks between the DISE and ACE enable commanders and leaders to refine plans enroute. This information draws from the near-real-time knowledge of national and theater assets on the situation in the AO. Split-based operations will become integral to Force XXI operations, not only for intelligence, but for all BOSs.

Synchronization

During initial operations, commanders will obtain information about the enemy situation from national assets. Once entry forces establish the lodgment, divisional organic sensors (unmanned aerial vehicles, Ground Based Common Sensor, and Advanced QUICKFIX), corps (GUARDRAIL Common Sensor), theater Army (TRACKWOLF), and theater assets (Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System) will also begin providing information on the enemy situation.

The precise location of enemy obstacles, positions, weapons, command and control facilities, reserves, air defense artillery and security elements, will convey to the commander an understanding of the battle space and the significance of the information presented. Presenting intelligence will reduce uncertainty and give commanders a thorough understanding of the battlefield. Intelligence operations, linked with the commander's requirements, will provide timely finished intelligence to influence decisions and

operations. During this phase, the division will rapidly acquire accurate information about the enemy while simultaneously attacking enemy information collectors.

The division will need to execute simultaneous attacks against the enemy throughout an increasingly larger battle space. MI, through the use of direct support MI companies at each maneuver brigade, will provide commanders with a thorough awareness of the entire extended battle space and will support target development and targeting in maneuver and information operations.

Broadcast Dissemination

Direct intelligence dissemination is especially important for targeting high value, fleeting targets with extremely short dwell times. Broadcast dissemination enables sensor data to simultaneously reach multiple Army echelons with time-sensitive information. This is essential when operating in the extended battle space of the 21st century battlefield. A variety of warfighting systems, dispersed throughout the division's battle space, will depend on the intelligence system providing accurate and timely targeting information. Maintaining a common situational battlefield awareness will also depend upon broadcast dissemination. The common picture must be relevant to each particular echelon, providing the commander the exact, detailed information he requires to accomplish his mission.

Conclusion

Our intelligence systems and doctrine are set to support Force XXI. They will support joint and land component commanders across the spectrum of conflict. We will continue to translate Force XXI requirements into doctrine and organizational structures for the next few years. The five doctrinal principles of MI guide and shape future MI doctrine and force structure. The result will be an enhanced and more responsive MI force. This force will be readily deployable to support the commander through the full spectrum of Force XXI military operations.

Sources

U.S. Army TRADOC **Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations,** 1 August 1994.

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, **Intel XXI - Strategy for the 21st Century,** April 1995.

Major Rogers is the Chief, Concepts and Master Plans Division, Directorate of Combat Developments. Readers can contact him at DSN 879-6268 or commercial (520) 538-6268.

Doctrine and Training

by James J. Adams

Army doctrine serves as a soldier's guide for conducting war and operations other than war. Doctrine, although authoritative and conventional, requires judgment when applied to an operation. In its intended application, doctrine gives soldiers guidance on "how to think," not "what to think," about an operation.

Categories of Doctrine

Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, states, *"Doctrine provides the fundamental principles by which military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application."* The three categories of doctrine defined in Joint Publication 1-02 are—

☐ **Combined doctrine** provides the fundamental principles that guide the employment of the forces of two or more nations in coordinated action toward a common objective. Participating nations ratify combined doctrine.

☐ **Multi-Service doctrine** provides the fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more Services in coordinated action toward a common objective. Two or more services ratify this doctrine.

☐ **Joint doctrine** provides the fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more Services in coordinated action toward a common objective. Joint and multi-Service doctrine are the same.

Elements of Doctrine

Tactics, techniques, and procedures are other doctrinal elements which can export doctrine. They are—

☐ **Tactics,** when reviewed separately, relate to how we employ units in combat. They are the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units relative to each other, or to the enemy, to exert their full potential.

☐ **Techniques,** on the other hand, provide methods to do assigned missions and functions. They furnish a basis to ensure uniformity of actions between units and within organizations. They can also be tied to current or near-term organizations and equipment, as opposed to doctrine.

☐ **Procedures** begin with a specific event which causes an activity to occur. The activity must produce a product that normally affects another external organization.

Drills are employed to exercise repetitive doctrine and training. The types of drills are—

☐ **Battle drills** apply to platoons or smaller units. They are trained responses to enemy actions or leaders' orders and are standard throughout the Army.

☐ **Crew drills** are collective actions. They consist of training

a crew on how to use a weapon or piece of equipment. This action is a trained response to a given stimulus, such as leader order or the status of the weapon or equipment. Like the battle drill it requires the fewest leader actions to accomplish and is standard throughout the Army.

Doctrine and Training

FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training, shows that individuals and units use doctrine to increase their capacity to do specific military functions and tasks.

Doctrine and training are equal partners in warfighting. Doctrine drives critical tasks for soldiers to execute during training. If training makes it apparent that some critical tasks are missing, then we must revise doctrine to reflect them. Based on a set of beliefs and experience about warfighting, doctrine reflects what usually works best. It is the basis for validating Army training, leadership, organization and materiel requirements.

As former Army Chief of Staff, General Gordon R. Sullivan, said *"Intellectual change leads physical change."* In a perfect world, doctrine drives training. All of the fundamental principles to support the warfighter should be in the doctrinal publication. During a time of rapid change, we must sometimes train on new systems in the absence of published doctrine. When this happens, leaders must develop standards that are challenging, attainable, and easily evaluated. Training developers provide the detail that is needed to train individual or collective tasks. Leaders and soldiers can then identify shortfalls and develop training standards to fill the doctrinal void. In this situation, doctrine plays catch-up and we train standards without doctrinal considerations.

Neither doctrine, nor training, can operate independently. The properties of both are critical to produce a power projection force that wins on all battlefields.

James J. Adams is Chief, Doctrinal Literature Branch, Directorate of Operations, Training, and Doctrine. Readers can reach the Doctrinal Literature Branch at DSN 879-0971, commercial (520) 538-0971.

MI CORPS HALL OF FAME

Sergeant Peter De Pasqua
Military Intelligence Corps
Hall of Fame Inductee 1988
Discipline: Counterintelligence

The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca dedicated Building 81305 as De Pasqua Barracks, in honor of the late Sergeant Peter de Pasqua, during the 1995 Military Intelligence Corps Hall of Fame ceremonies. Sergeant de Pasqua's gallant and brave undercover work in France during World War I earned him the distinction of being the first member of the Corps of Intelligence Police of the American Expeditionary Forces France to receive the Citation for Meritorious Service.

Sergeant de Pasqua's most important assignment was in the old French city of Beaune, an important center of the American Services of Supply, in the summer of 1918. De Pasqua, born in Portugal and fluent in several European languages, infiltrated through enemy lines and gained the confidence of Spanish subversives working for the Germans. By acting as an American-hating anarchist, he discovered the group leader was an agent of the German Secret Service in Northern Spain. By acquiring an mail censor's stamp, Sergeant de Pasqua intercepted the agent's mail to his German chief. These letters related to a map of Beaune, plans of all the American works occurring there, and plots to bomb the base hospitals and a French ammunition dump. His firsthand accounts of his activities convinced French counterespionage forces to act, thwarting all of the subversive group's plans and plots.

Despite Sergeant de Pasqua's valorous service and several recommendations, he was not eligible for the Distinguished Service Medal because he was a noncommissioned officer. His recognition did not occur until 1932, when his activities were declassi-

fied. The War Department revived the Purple Heart merit award earlier the same year in remembrance of the leader who established it, General George Washington. Sergeant Peter de Pasqua became the first American war veteran in Paris to receive the Military Order of the Purple Heart.

PROPONENT NOTES

Women in the Army

Since 1 October 1994, the number of positions open to women has increased greatly. Except for military occupational specialty (MOS) 96R, Ground Surveillance Systems Operator, all military intelligence (MI) units are open to women. Of major importance, women can now serve in combat maneuver brigade headquarters and special forces group headquarters and headquarters companies.

Point of contact: Charlotte Borghardt, DSN 821-1188.

MOS 98D and 98H Merger

There are many issues to resolve before the Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) finalizes his recommendation on merging MOSs 98D and 98H. The USAIC&FH hosted several working groups during the past year concerning the MOS 98D and 98H merger proposal. Given the rapid pace of technological and mission changes, the primary concern is to ensure that any MOS revisions meet the Army's future requirements. To ensure that MI is looking to the future, USAIC&FH recently requested the National Security Agency provide additional data on technological and mission changes at the national level.

Point of contact: Master Sergeant Sames, DSN 821-1450.

CMF 33 AR 611-2O1 Updates

The following summarizes career management field (CMF) 33 revisions to AR 611-2O1 currently at U.S. Army Personnel Command for final resolution:

☐ Transferring QUICKFIX maintenance responsibility from MOS 33R to MOS 33T.

☐ Revising the Standards of Grade Tables for MOS 33R and MOS 33T to correct the noncommissioned officer force structure.

☐ Regrading MOS 33T U.S. Army Special Operations Command support positions from specialist to sergeant.

☐ Deleting additional skill identification (ASI) 2L (Aerial Sensor Repair), H6 (Data Analysis-TEMPEST), and 6N (ASAS Maintenance).

☐ Disassociating CMF 33 from ASI 1T (IPDS/TRAC/NIS TENCAP Operations).

☐ Creating ASI 4T (TENCAP Integrator and Maintainer) for support of the TENCAP Tactical Radar Correlator and the Modernized Imagery Exploitation System.

Points of contact: Master Sergeant Sagmoe and Sergeant First Class Savage, DSN 821-1182 or 1184.

CMF 33 Restructure

There is an ongoing front end analysis to determine MOS composition and future maintenance focus within CMF 33. Soldier survey analysis began in August 1995. Results will influence future training and force structure. A decision concerning conduct of a Critical Task Site Selection Board is yet to be determined.

Point of contact: Sergeant First Class Lowman, ATZS-TDI-C, DSN 879-1123.

Shortage of USAR and ARNG MI Warrant Officers

The U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) and Army National Guard (ARNG) are critically short of MI Warrant Officers. USAR has only 323 of its authorized 475 and the ARNG has only 75 of its fill of 342. The most critically short specialties for both components are MOS 351B, Counterintelligence Warrant Officer, and MOS 351E, Interrogation Warrant Officer. The Office of the Chief, Military Intelligence (OCMI) is working closely with the Office of the Chief of Army Reserves and the National Guard Bureau to increase the MI warrant officer fill for both components.

The OCMI Warrant Officer Professional Development Manager (WOPDM) recently made field assistance visits to several National Guard units to conduct predetermination reviews of warrant officer applications. These reviews reduce the application processing time by 3 to 6 months. During a recent visit to the 260th MI Battalion, Florida ARNG, the WOPDM screened 27 applicants of whom 24 were proponent qualified. This yielded an increase from 2 to 26 warrant officers.

Warrant officer applicants must meet the MI proponent prerequisites listed in Department of the Army (DA) **Pamphlet 601-94-1, Warrant Officer Procurement**. OCMI will, on a case-by-case basis, consider waiver of prerequisites. All applicants must attend the Warrant Officer Candidate School, a rigorous and high stress training environment.

Point of contact: Chief Warrant Officer Four Platt, OCMI WOPDM, DSN 821-1183 or commercial (520) 533-1183.

Civilian Intelligence Personnel Management System (CIPMS) Update

The Army is moving toward the regionalization of all civilian personnel servicing. The intelligence

community is concurrently preparing a plan that complies with the DA guidance yet protects unique intelligence interests. Pay banding, rank-in-person, and exit management are integrated into a new system design. A reinvented CIPMS could be ready for implementation in fiscal year 1997.

Point of contact: Charlotte Borghardt, DSN 821-1188.

Foreign Language Proficiency Pay (FLPP) for Civilians

The Intelligence Authorization Act of 1990 provides for special pay for Department of Defense civilian employees who are proficient in a foreign language. The language must be important for effective collection, production, or dissemination of foreign intelligence. Civilians must also be serving in an intelligence or related position. These positions include support for arms control treaties or special operations.

The Act also provides for inclusion of those who could be subject to assignment to such positions. Implementation for FLPP for eligible employees is projected to begin in fiscal year 1996. The DA FLPP User's Guide will be ready for distribution to the field in October 1995. Initially, DA sought centralized civilian FLPP funding. However, DA determined that if a command wishes to participate, steps should be taken to accommodate this program from local resources. The civilian FLPP program will provide special pay to employees for achieving and maintaining proficiency, as tested annually through the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT). An employee must show a DLPT proficiency level of 2 or greater in at least two skills (listening, speaking, or reading) for category I and II languages and 1 plus for category III and IV languages. The rate of pay for civilian FLPP will be $25 to $100 for one language per pay period with a maximum of $150 per pay period for multiple languages.

Point of contact: Charlotte Borghardt, DSN 821-1188.

Address Update

OCMI needs your help to update our address list. Accuracy is imperative to ensure timely dissemination of information to all units and activities with MI personnel. Please forward updates to either electrical message addresses and office symbols or E-mail addresses:

Commander
USAIC&FH
ATTN: ATZS-MI
Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000

E-mail address: sagmoe@pentagon-hqdadss.army.mil

PROFS users: hua1(atzs-mi) or for3083(sagmoe)

Point of contact: Master Sergeant Sagmoe, DSN 821-1182/1184.

RESERVE COMPONENT

Reserve Component Linguist Unit Concept

The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) recently published the first doctrinal justification and guidance for the use of the Reserve Component (RC) military intelligence (MI) linguist. The MI Relook established the requirement for this structure and determined that the outdated existing RC MI structure and strategy was not capable of supporting post-Cold War requirements.

There is a consensus that RC MI units supporting the Active Component (AC) theater and corps will be unnecessary as a replicate battalion or company structure but needed rather as augmentation elements, accessible to the team level via derivative unit identification code (UIC). Furthermore, recent history indicates that a smaller continental United States (CONUS)-based Army has a need for qualified linguists to support its power projection strategies, maintaining a full range of capabilities during a 24-hour operation. Resource and staffing constraints prevent the AC from fully answering this requirement from within its own force structure.

Mission and Structure

The mission of the RC linguist units will be to provide accessible language-qualified augmentation teams to the AC commanders. The deployable linguist teams, in a single language and military occupational specialty (MOS) configuration, will align with an identified AC corps- or theater-level unit which has responsibility for the area of operations in which the linguist team will function. This relationship is part of the RC MI Force Design Update.

Structurally, the organization of the deployable five-soldier linguist teams maximizes both peacetime training and cohesion and wartime mission accomplishment. The MI RC linguist force is fielding five separate team types:

☐ Translator - Interpreter Teams (MOS 97L) will serve as a basic linguist resource to MI units and other users such as military police, civil affairs, and host country liaison. These teams will provide interpreter support and create tactical translation reports.

☐ Counterintelligence (CI) Teams (MOS 97B) will perform

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the full range of CI missions in the target language or English.

☐ Interrogator Teams (MOS 97E) will perform interrogation and screening of enemy prisoners of war.

☐ Signals Intelligence Analysis Teams (MOS 98C) will perform analysis using either their target language or English.

☐ Signals Intelligence Collection Teams (MOS 98G) will conduct voice intercept missions.

The basic deployable unit is a five-soldier team. A headquarters element should accompany the deployed linguist unit to provide command and control, liaison to the supported unit, and quality control. Our experience in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM strongly suggests that linguist teams need a headquarters element to centrally manage them rather than each team working independently under direct and permanent control of the supported unit. Central management ensures proper use, a higher availability rate, and a quicker turn-around to the force as a whole. The size of the linguist support headquarters varies directly with the number of linguist teams deployed. Figure 1 displays the recommended ratio of deployed teams to headquarters element.

CALL FORWARD 1996

Fort Huachuca, Arizona, will be the site for a major mobilization

Number of Teams	Required Headquarters
1-4 teams	Platoon
8-16 teams	Company
2 companies or more	Battalion

Figure 1. Recommended Ratio of Teams to Headquarters.

exercise, CALL FORWARD 1996, scheduled for June 1996. Exercise CALL FORWARD 1996 will test the RC and the installation's readiness to support a mobilization. For the exercise, nearly 1000 U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) and Army National Guard (ARNG) soldiers will report to Fort Huachuca over a two-week period. Most of the participants will be members of RC units from the Southwest Region. Another 100 will be MI Inactive Ready Reserve (IRR) soldiers called up for predeployment refresher training.

The 6th Reserve Forces School-Intelligence (RFS-I) will support the USAIC&FH refresher training during Exercise CALL FORWARD 1996. Five RFS-Is are affiliated with the USAIC&FH through WARTRACE. During Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, the RFS-Is mobilized, in part, to support the MI proponent.

New ARNG Advisor

Major Steve Ponder replaced Lieutenant Colonel David Miner

as the ARNG advisor to the USAIC&FH. Lieutenant Colonel Miner is retiring after more than 26 years of distinguished service in both the AC Army and ARNG. He has served as the ARNG's representative to the Intelligence Center since August 1991. He worked the National Guard's portion of the RC MI Force Design Update. The Force Design Update assigns an additional fifteen MI companies and seven MI cadre battalions to the ARNG structure. He was also largely responsible for developing the RC MI Linguist Unit Concept. His replacement, Major Steve Ponder comes to us from the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, after having served with ARNG's 35th Infantry Division.

Point of contact: Colonel John Craig, Chief of Reserve Forces Office, USAIC&FH, at DSN 821-1176, commercial (520) 533-1176, or E-mail craigj%hua1@ huachuca-emh11.army.mil.

PUBLISHED! New Training and Doctrine Manuals Completed

The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca completed several manuals during 1995. Except for the test draft of FM 34-25-2, the Army will publish and distribute these new manuals beginning in 1st quarter, fiscal year 1996. Units should update their Standard Army Publications System account to reflect the following:

☐ **FM 34-25-1, Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System**, 3 October 1995 (Block Number 5282).

☐ **FM 34-25-2, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (Test Draft)**, June 1995 (POC is James Adams, DSN 879-0971).

☐ **FM 34-25-3, All-Source Analysis System and the Analysis and Control Element**, 3 October 1995 (Block Number 5370).

☐ **FM 34-25-7, Special Electronic Mission Aircraft Survivability**, 3 October 1995 (Block Number 5284).

☐ **FM 34-60, Counterintelligence**, 3 October 1995 (Block Number 1134).

☐ **ARTEP 34-113-11, Military Intelligence Collective Training Standards Document Volume I**, 29 September 1995 (Block Number 1554).

☐ **ARTEP 34-113-12, Military Intelligence Collective Training Standards Document Volume II**, 29 September 1995 (Block Number 1554).

Big League

of good enough. Simple stick figure sketches are worth a thousand words, but they must be clear and concise. Remember to label everything and save it. The entire package will make an invaluable training tool when you return to your own home field. Make your own playbook similar to the one you prepared for the division commander, only much more comprehensive. Tab everything and hold on to it; it will become a well-worn friend.

End Zone

No matter what the activity, putting together a winning team requires a focused training effort. The BCTP Warfighter Seminar provides the perfect venue for coaches and players to work out the bugs, define strategies, to learn, grow and function as a team. This experience along with continued practices back home will forge a team capable of focusing on tactical operations and understanding current doctrine and tactics. Perhaps the greatest benefit will be the unity established between the commander and his team—his primary staff and subordinate commanders.

Sergeant First Class Nicholas Rozumny is the noncommissioned officer in charge of the G2 Plans Section, 2d Armored Division, at Fort Hood, Texas. His previous assignments include First Sergeant, Company A, 163d MI Battalion, and First Sergeant, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 504th MI Brigade. Sergeant First Class Rozumny has one year of college and is continuing his education at Central Texas College.Big League

Assignment Goodfellow

Instructor Duty—Challenging and Rewarding

Instructor duty at Goodfellow gives the very best Air Force commissioned and noncommissioned officers the opportunity to help build the intelligence and firefighting career force of the future. Duty days are long and filled with plenty of challenges. Instructors are not only expected to deal with every facet of the student's academic and military progression, but also to maintain the "health" of the course through continuous feedback from the field.

The instructors gain feedback through the Graduate Assessment Survey. The survey is one of the newest forms for gaining feedback from the field. The survey is sent directly from Headquarters, 2d Air Force, at Keesler AFB to supervisors of graduates at all operational Air Force wings, centers, and agencies. The instructor must contact the graduate's rater for any rating below satisfactory. Through discussion with the rater, the instructor is able to identify and resolve potential training shortfalls.

In addition to the Graduate Assessment Survey, a feedback program has begun that sends instructors "back to the field" to get face-to-face feedback from our operational customers, former students and their supervisors.

Taken in total, these efforts to improve the quality of training at Goodfellow Air Force Base are paying big dividends to our students as well as to our operational unit customers.

As we strive to acquire and integrate the latest fielded equipment into our classrooms and to change our training delivery methods, we hope to make Goodfellow AFB the assignment of choice for up-and-coming commissioned and noncommissioned officers who want to "touch the future" by teaching tomorrow's leaders.

The Future

The 17th Training Wing and Goodfellow AFB have earned a reputation throughout the Air Force as a true center of excellence, and not just for intelligence training. We at Goodfellow expect the Wing to take on even newer missions as the Air Force, and all Services, downsize and consolidate. We are more than ready for the challenge.

Lieutenant Colonel Michael R. Rogers is the commander, 316th Training Squadron, Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas. A career SIGINT officer, his assignments and duties have taken him to all corners of the globe including Hawaii, Saudi Arabia, Iceland, Greece, the United Kingdom, and Panama. Lieutenant Colonel Rogers is a 1977 graduate of the United States Air Force Academy.

Intelligence operations instructor aids a student studying the radar navigation.

PROFESSIONAL READER

Rebel Raider: The Life of General John Hunt Morgan by James A. Ramage (Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1986), 306 pages, $18.95.

The Confederacy, in its time of need during its struggle for independence, often relied on the unorthodox. Nowhere was the unorthodox more prevalent than in the western theater of the war. In Mississippi and Alabama, in Tennessee and Kentucky, bold commanders like Nathan Bedford Forrest and John Hunt Morgan struck fear into the ranks of Yankee armies. Often ill-equipped, always outnumbered, they persevered through daring and audacity, through bluff and through courage. Today's soldier will learn much by studying the tactics and operations of such leaders.

John Hunt Morgan, at once the devil threatening Ohio and Indiana and the darling cavalier of the Confederacy, did not lead a massed army against the enemy. Morgan, like Forrest, with few troops but great boldness, caused the Federal command to divert thousands of troops to guard railroads and lines of communications, build stockades to protect supply dumps, and chase the elusive guerrillas. Morgan, according to Mr. Ramage, intuitively adopted the tactics of the guerrilla. His strategies and operations would not be out of context in today's fast-moving world.

While Morgan did not lead his troops in major battles or campaigns, he contributed significantly to the Confederate war effort. His primary offering was intelligence. Operating far behind enemy lines, Morgan's Kentucky cavalrymen raided enemy installations, "appropriated" arms and supplies and, most importantly, gathered information. Ranging from middle Tennessee to the Ohio River, Morgan scouted the Yankee movements, intuitively discerning intent and relaying that intelligence to his superiors. Morgan was, many times, commended by the War Department for his efforts.

When an army is at an economic and manpower disadvantage, necessity often forces innovation. Morgan's command is a good example. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) may have been born in Kentucky in 1862. In Morgan's command was a Canadian born telegrapher, George "Lightning" Ellsworth. Private Ellsworth was adept at mimicking the technique of any telegrapher. He developed a portable system which allowed him to tap into Federal telegraph lines, intercepting messages and inserting "imitative communications deception (ICD)." Ellsworth's success gave Morgan a great advantage in planning operations and discerning enemy intentions. Many a Union commander found himself responding to orders or reports not from his higher headquarters but from "Lightning" Ellsworth! Morgan also saw the value in interrogation of civilians and refugees, a prime part of counter-intelligence operations. Through skillful questioning, not only was much information about the enemy and his movements obtained, but enemy spies were ferreted out.

A term much used in today's Army is IPB or intelligence preparation of the battlefield. Morgan did not call it that but he certainly practiced it. His raids and scouting parties, Ellsworth's communications interception and his counterintelligence work all gave Morgan and his superiors a fuller knowledge of the impending battle. Even while on operations, Morgan did not ignore combat intelligence. A guerrilla band depends on accurate information. He sent scout detachments to the front, on the flanks and to the rear. He used "rolling videttes", hand-picked horsemen who reconnoitered and guarded every crossroad, every bridge, every ford until the main body arrived, then leapfrogged to the front again. Rarely, were the Kentuckians surprised! Morgan's command was a prime example of efficient use of intelligence to gain success against a superior enemy. Morgan's innovative tactics and organization of his soldiers was the model used by the Confederate War Department when "Partisan" organizations were authorized for the Army. Units led by Morgan, Forrest and Mosby became the Confederacy's "Special Operations Command."

I highly recommend this book to the military intelligence professional as a good read and as documentation of the history of combat intelligence operations. **Rebel Raider** won the 1986 Douglas Southall Freeman History Award. The reader will find much familiar territory in Mr. Ramage's account of John Hunt Morgan, partisan leader and Confederate hero.

Command Sergeant Major
Curtis E. Tipton
Fort Huachuca, Arizona

Prodigal Soldiers: How the Generation of Officers Born of Vietnam Revolutionized the American Style of War by James Kitfield (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 480 pages, $25.

Following Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, the American military demonstrated to the American public that it had not been idle in the two decades following the Vietnam War. **Prodigal Soldiers** is a breathtaking and spellbinding story of how the Services and Congress rebuilt the Services and prepared for the striking success in the Persian Gulf.

Prodigal Soldiers is a story of readiness, training, the all-volunteer military, joint service reform, management, and a group of visionaries who took a military that had lost its way and built from it a trained and ready force.

Kitfield tells this story through the lives of General Barry McCaffrey, a division commander in the Persian Gulf War; Admiral Stanley Arthur, Central Command's (CENTCOM) Naval Commander; General Charles Horner, CENTCOM Air Commander; General Walt Boomer, CENTCOM's Marine Corps Force commander; and General W.L. "Bill" Creech, a former commander of Tactical Air Command.

General Barry McCaffrey is the central figure throughout this story. The reader is told the inside account of the building of the armed forces. Woven throughout is the background on the development of a warfighting doctrine spearheaded by General William DePuy and his team of visionary professional officers including Generals Thurman and Gorman, the "father of the National Training Center."

The reader learns about the history of the all-volunteer Army, the National Training Center, Nellis Air Force Base and "Red Flag," the genesis of Army leader training and school systems, the management renaissance (the same principles as Total Quality Management (TQM)) in the U.S. Air Force led by General Creech, the joint service story, and the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act among others.

Prodigal Soldiers is an incisive story that explains in rich detail how a selfless and visionary group of officers learned from the mistakes of Vietnam. Kitfield's book is one of a series of publications over the past decade that have addressed this American military renaissance. Alvin and Heidi Toffler in **War and Anti-War** illustrated the doctrinal and technological revolution; the book **America's First Battles** by Heller and Stofft raised our awareness about the Army's history to be learned from war; certainly the works of Harry Summer **On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context** and Moore and Galloway's **We Were Soldiers Once...And Young** provide an understanding of the war and emotions of Vietnam.

Kitfield has done a masterful job detailing how the "hollow" forces of the 1970s became a powerhouse in the Persian Gulf. Because the author views this military renaissance through the eyes of Generals McCaffrey, Boomer, Horner and Admiral Arthur, there are voids in his story. Some of the details and lessons learned from Operation JUST CAUSE and recent deployments characterized as "operations other than war" are missing. The narrative of the building of a volunteer Army and reserve component would have been richer if told through the words of noncommissioned officers and soldiers. Finally, there is an occasional factual error such as reference to General Meyer as a former commander of the 82d Airborne Division (page 205) [He was an assistant division commander for support and for operations.]

For depth of information, clarity and precision as well as sheer story telling, **Prodigal Soldiers** is a powerful story of the American military since Vietnam.

Lieutenant Colonel R. F. Riccardelli
Fort Campbell, Kentucky

304th Military Intelligence Battalion

The lightning denotes technology while the diamond and taeguk simulate an eye; together they represent the vigilance, celerity, and communication of Army Intelligence. The vine leaf symbolizes the unit's participation in the Rhineland Campaign. The taeguk represents the unit's service in the Korean War. The black triangle denotes iron and alludes to the Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation.

The 304th Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion provides maintenance, training, and test support to the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, Fort Huachuca, Arizona. The battalion trains special electronic mission aircraft crews, QUICKFIX voice collection operators, and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operators. It operates and maintains Fort Huachuca's Libby Army Airfield. The battalion's maintenance facility provides tracked, wheeled, electronic, and computer maintenance support for the Intelligence Center. The 304th MI Battalion supports the testing and institutional training of collection, jamming, direction finding, ground surveillance, and UAV systems. The battalion's UAV companies and TROJAN Special Purpose Integrated Remote Intelligence Terminal (SPIRIT) teams support new equipment training and contingency operations worldwide.

The lineage of the 304th MI Battalion derives from the 590th Signal Depot Company, constituted 15 April 1944 and activated 7 June 1944 in North Africa. From 1944 to 1975, the battalion underwent a series of activations, inactivations, and redesignations. In June 1955, the Army released the unit from active military service to reserve status. On 1 April 1975, the Army redesignated and activated the unit as the 304th Army Security Agency Battalion in Houston, Texas. On 27 October 1976, the battalion relocated to Pasedena, Texas, where it inactivated on 17 September 1988. On 17 August 1990, the Army reactivated the battalion as the 304th MI Battalion, 111th MI Brigade (Training), at Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

The 304th MI Battalion is a leader in training, operational employment, and doctrine development for UAV systems and the TROJAN SPIRIT. It developed the UAV military occupational specialty-producing course of instruction and established the DOD joint training standards for UAVs. The battalion was the first Army unit to receive the Pioneer UAV, the Hunter UAV, the TROJAN SPIRIT 1.5, and the TROJAN SPIRIT II. The 304th MI Battalion has deployed its unique system and highly trained soldiers to real world conflicts in Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and Haiti. The battalion has supported exercises such as Operation DESERT CAPTURE (ODC), ODC II, ROVING SANDS '95, PRAIRIE WARRIOR '95, and numerous deployments to the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center.

Fort Huachuca's "Desert Thunder" battalion focuses on training, testing, and doctrine development to meet present and future warfighter requirements and bring Army intelligence into the 21st century. The 304th MI Battalion functions on the cutting edge of Force XXI technology and is boldly leading the way to the Army of the future. **DESERT THUNDER!**

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Air Force Intelligence Training

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